


HISTORICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION
OF
COMBINED ARMY OPERATIONS
FOR
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR DOCTRINE
TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
JUNE 26, 1990



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MILITARY PROFESSIONAL RESOURCES, INC.
1201 East Abingdon Drive, Suite 425
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 684-0853

June 26, 1990

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine
ATTN: Director, Combined Doctrine Directorate
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-5000

Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) is pleased to forward two copies of a Historical Review and Evaluation of Combined Army Operations for use in developing a manual concerning Army operations in a combined forces environment.

The attached report is a deliverable in accordance with Delivery Order 0012, Contract Number DABT60-89-D-1572. Submission of this deliverable constitutes completion of the referenced delivery order. A companion report (Delivery Order 0017), with focus on Vietnam, is being prepared and will be submitted prior to July 31, 1990.

Respectfully,

ROBERT B. ADAIR
Project Director

Enclosure

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PREFACE

In accordance with the terms and conditions of Contract Number DABT60-89-D-1572, Delivery Order 0012, Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) is required to develop source material in support of the writing and publication of an Army manual dealing with Army involvement in combined operations. Specifically, MPRI is tasked to provide qualified functional support to the Director of Combined Doctrine Directorate as follows:

a. Conduct an on-site review and evaluation of the oral history program holdings at the Army War College. Select appropriate portions of the information pertaining to the subject of Combined Army operations, extract the data and provide a report on the findings.

b. Conduct a literature search of holdings at the Army War College, National Defense University and other sites in the Washington D.C. area. The search will concentrate on collecting and evaluating information dealing with combined army operations.

To fulfill the requirements of this project, an extensive range of historical materials was consulted at the U.S. Army War College Library and the library and archives of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In addition, holdings were examined at the National Defense University, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Pentagon Army Library. Published books and articles, oral history transcripts, lecture transcripts and student research papers, and a variety of archival documents were included in the search for materials on coalition warfare, combined operations, and command of units at the Theater, Army Group, and Field Army Level. Any number of methods might be adopted for organizing and presenting the varied and voluminous data obtained during this review and evaluation of the literature on combined operations. After careful study, it was determined that an analysis based on World Wars I and II, Korea, and the formation of NATO offers the optimum method of addressing the key issues.

MPRI point of contact for this report is Mr. Howard R. Guffey, (703) 684-0853.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The history of U.S. military operations in the Twentieth Century has been a story of coalition warfare. The century opened with participation of the United States Army in the China Relief Expedition. That brief introduction to combined operations was soon followed by American participation as an essential, if junior, partner in the First World War. And before the mid-century point was reached, the United States assumed a position of leadership as one of the three major partners in the greatest coalition war of all time, the Second World War, after which the conduct of warfare as a member of a coalition came to be viewed as the norm rather than as an exception to America's traditional isolation in international politics and military affairs. Today, "the United States is currently a party to six treaties that commit us to the defense of 41 countries. In the event of war, this network of foreign alliances, and the possible creation of others, makes it highly likely that military operations will be conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for accomplishment of a single mission." [Stuckey, 45]

"Waging war on an Allied basis is historically and traditionally difficult....[S]mooth operations are only the result of considerable initial friction which finally produces the finely burnished surfaces that enable the machine to run without too much heat." [Smith, 455] As one prominent American commander of World War II and later Chief of Military History, MG Orlando Ward, has noted, "There is but one thing more difficult than fighting a war with Allies---this is to fight a war without them." [Romanus and Sunderland, vii] MG Fox Conner, a prominent staff officer in World War I and the mentor of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, also noted in a lecture at the Army War College in 1939 that: "Dealing with the enemy is a simple and straight-forward matter when contrasted with securing close cooperation with an ally. By the same token no small part of our War College Studies should be devoted to an endeavor to foresee exactly what to expect and how to reduce friction should we have Allies, which may God forbid, in the next war." [Conner, 1]

Yet despite continuous experience with coalition warfare since the turn of the century, the United States Army has rather persistently refused to accept coalition warfare as the dominant mode and to prepare itself accordingly. "The United States Army lacks a tradition, and its military educational system currently minimizes the factor of functional allied interoperability. Yet, since 1941, the United States military forces have performed mainly as part of an allied team." [Cooling and Hixson, *Interoperability of Allied Forces in Europe: Some Peacetime Realities*, 33] Indeed, as Cooling and Hixson point out, the functional, pragmatic issues of allied interoperability have been neglected in times of peace but "the problems of interoperability have

been solved--when they have been solved at all--primarily through trial and error during actual combat operations over an extended period of time." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 1 and 3]

This report is geared toward providing a greater awareness of the characteristics of successful combined operations and of the problems which stand in the way of achieving effective unity of action with allies in a combined military operation. Functionally, the extensive data on this subject has been organized into three distinct parts which deal with World Wars I and II, Korea, and NATO. Within each part, additional structuring was developed in order to capture the common thrust of both recommendations and deficiencies as presented in the multiple source materials. Moreover, each part includes a summary section and a bibliography to facilitate subsequent research, analysis and the arrangement of key references.

In an article entitled "Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in Combined Operations" ("Military Review, 27, no. 7 (October 1947), pages 3-15) General Jacob L. Devers (who served in World War II as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and Commanding General of the United States Forces in the North African Theater of Operations, Commanding General of the 6th Army Group, and later as Commanding General, Army Ground Forces) lists six major problems that will confront a Theater Commander in combined operations. Although as he states them, General Devers' six problems are a bit too specific to serve as an organizing framework, it has proven useful to organize the World War I and II material generally along the lines suggested by him. Thus, this summary of pertinent information in Part I is organized under the following headings:

- Differences in Culture and Objectives
- Differences in Military Doctrine, Training, and Equipment
- Difference in Logistics
- Political and Strategic Direction
- The Commander and his Staff in Combined Operations
- The Impact of Personality

Parts II and III, which encompass Korea and NATO, are organized along somewhat parallel lines as a means to best focus the views of the authors as they relate to these periods. Accordingly, research on Korea and NATO is structured as follows:

- Clarity and Firmness of Directives
- Conflicting Political, Economic and Military Problems
- Logistic Capabilities
- Armament, Training and Tactical Doctrines
- Personal Intervention
- Personalities of Senior Commanders

The volume of available material on combined operations in general and the role of the Supreme Commander in combined operations in particular is great. Unfortunately, most of this material does not address directly the role of the U.S. Army component commander in a combined theater of operations. Most deals with the generalities of coalition warfare and the level immediately above the Army component commander, that of the Supreme Allied Commander in a theater. Consequently, the student interested in the specific role, tasks, and desired characteristics of an Army component commander must read between the lines in a massive amount of material dealing with the higher political and strategic direction of coalition warfare or must interpolate from the smaller amount of material which deals with the command of larger units (EAC) in general.

One might assume that the oral history interviews conducted as part of the USAWC/USAMHI Senior Officer Oral History Program would be a fruitful source of material on the details of combined command. However, a brief survey of the available oral history transcripts indicates that there is in fact little that relates directly to the topic at hand, in part because of the way the interviews themselves are structured and in part because the interviewees, although having great experience in combined operations, apparently considered many of the "theoretical" aspects of combined operations either too obvious or too complex to address. Oral history interviewees are also notorious for presenting the positive side of their activities and many of the most pertinent details of command in combined operations involve decidedly negative matters.

The published memoirs of former U.S. commanders in combined operations are actually much more valuable for gaining an appreciation of the various aspects of combined command. In particular, the student of the subject is advised to consult the published memoirs of such figures as John J. Pershing (*My Experiences in the World War*), Dwight D. Eisenhower (*Crusade in Europe*), Mark Clark (*Calculated Risk*), and Douglas MacArthur (*Reminiscences*) or the many good biographies of such important military figures. The important issues of combined command are usually highlighted in such works much more clearly than in any oral history interview.

The official reports of General Pershing (for the AEF in World War I) and General Eisenhower (for the European Theater in World War II) are also very important and useful sources of information, although it must be remembered that many of the problems of coalition command were smoothed over by these two commanders in their public reports.

Another source which is particularly good for our present purpose is the collection of lectures and student research papers from the archives of the Army War College. In many cases the issues of command in combined operations are clearly delineated and the existing literature (or personal experience in the case of lectures) is

conveniently distilled and summarized. Articles in the various professional military journals also provide a rich source. Reflection on World War II and the creation of NATO in 1949 promoted a number of informative articles in *Military Review* in the early 1950s dealing with various aspects of combined operations. And as always the primary source for all aspects of U.S. Army activities in the Second World War are the volumes of the official *United States Army in World War II* series, the well-known "Green Books". Particularly valuable for the study of coalition warfare and combined operations are Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, and Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*.

The student of combined operations is also fortunate in having two major works which address the topic directly and which represent a significant survey and useful summary of a wide range of existing materials on the topic. In the late 1970s and early 1980s two historians at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Dr. B. Franklin Cooling and LTC John A. Hixson, prepared a major study of coalition warfare, combined operations, and "interoperability", using a wide variety of sources. Cooling and Hixson, responding to a request by the CINC, USAREUR, General George Blanchard, presented a distillation of their research in the volume entitled *Combined Operations in Peace and War* (revised edition, Carlisle Barracks, PA; USAAMHI, 1982) and also presented particular pieces of their material in a number of separate lectures, articles, and papers.

The other major compilation of material on the topic is LTC Gary L. Bounds and others, *Larger Units: Theater Army--Army Group--Field Army* (Combat Studies Institute Report No. 6, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, January 1985), a collection of five excellent essays on larger unit organization and operations in World War II (North Africa and the Mediterranean, ETO, and Pacific), Korea, and Vietnam prepared by historians of the Combat Studies Institute for the Concept Development Directorate, Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, in support of the Theater Army Concept Development Project. Each of the essays examines in detail the organizational arrangements, including command and control and staff organization, for U.S. theater armies, army groups, and field armies as part of a combined force. Each essay contains notes and a bibliography of sources. An introduction and summary chapter draw together the "lessons learned" and salient aspects. This volume of essays has been supplemented by an excellent annotated bibliography of works on the organization and operations of larger units in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam (LTC Gary L. Bounds, *Larger Units: Theater Army--Army Group--Field Army*. CSI Historical Bibliography No. 4, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, September 1984). A detailed study of the Cooling/Hixson and CSI volumes alone would provide an excellent summary of scholarship and opinion on the subject of combined operations in general and the role of the U.S. Army component commander in a combined theater.

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PART I: WORLD WARS I AND II

INTRODUCTION

From its very beginnings the United States Army has, more often than not, conducted military operations in conjunction with allies. The first experience occurred in the Revolutionary War when the armies under George Washington operated together with French ground and naval forces and received considerable logistical support from our French ally. American operations in the Nineteenth Century were conducted on a unilateral basis, but the Twentieth Century began with American participation in the multi-national China Relief Expedition. Although the personal conduct of the American commander, General Adna R. Chaffee, Sr., is worthy of further study, the Relief Expedition itself was far too brief and ad hoc to provide significant lessons on combined operations applicable in the present day. Our first major experience of modern coalition warfare came with US entry to the first World War in April 1917. Although the duration of American participation in World War I was too brief to permit the resolution of many of the salient problems of a decidedly junior partner in combined operations, most of the key issues of coalition warfare and combined operations were surfaced, and the problems and actions of the commander of the American Expeditionary Force, General John J. Pershing, are most important. The brief participation of the US Army in the Allied intervention in North Russia and in Siberia in 1918-1919 is also a source of much information on combined operations in a highly charged political atmosphere.

In the grand coalition of World War II the United States was no longer a junior partner but rather emerged as the leader of combined operations on a world-wide scale. The story of General Dwight D. Eisenhower's performance as Supreme Allied Commander in North Africa and then in Northwest Europe is of particular interest for the study of the theater commander in combined operations. Similarly, General Mark W. Clark's experience as commander of the US Fifth Army (and later of 15th Army Group) in Italy is a particular rich source of pertinent information. In Asia, the history of the Allied Southeast Asia Command and the activities of the multi-hatted General Joseph Stilwell and his successor, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, in China are particularly instructive, largely as a negative example. The war in the Pacific was almost exclusively an American affair, although the forces of both General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz did contain significant numbers of Allied land, air and naval forces, particularly Australian forces.

In general, the American experience in Europe in both World War I and World War II provides the most cogent information on the organization and conduct of combined operations at the theater level. And the materials covered in this pastiche focus on the North African,

Mediterranean, and European Theaters in World War II. Although the material has been organized in the six categories suggested by General Jacob L. Devers' article in *Military Review*, the issues often do not fit neatly into one of the six categories.

Successful coalitions do not just happen; they result from study, hard work, and intelligent application of proven principles. Peckham states that: "A study of coalitions in modern times indicates that three general conditions must be obtained if the coalition is to succeed. These conditions require:

1. That the respective governments must not only agree on the common political, economic, and social objectives, but also that they coordinate their efforts to attain these objectives....

2. That the respective governments must agree on strategic plans, which will permit their military staffs to prepare supporting plans for the employment of their national forces in the most effective manner, for the achievement of the common objectives....

3. That the respective governments must agree to unity of command in any theater of operations where the forces of two or more of the nations concerned are to be employed concurrently." [Peckham, 46]

"It is with the second and third conditions required in warfare conducted by a coalition of nations that the military planner is primarily concerned." [Peckham, 47]

One of the key overall issues is the proper organization of a successful coalition effort. One statement of this issue outlines "...the following possible procedures in the establishment of an organization for the exercise of combined military command:

1. The creation of a council of defense minister, whose principal function will be that of coordinating political and military considerations resulting from the decisions and agreements of the heads of the participating nations.

2. The creation of a committee of the chiefs of staff of the allied nations whose functions will include strategic planning, coordination, and direction for the overall employment of the allied means allotted for the conduct of war.

3. Agreement and definition by both the heads of states and the committee of the chiefs of staff of the role of each of the contributing members of the alliance....

4. The designation of a supreme allied commander for each combined theater of operations who, under the direction of the committee of the chiefs of staff, will be responsible for accomplishing the overall mission in the theater for which he is appointed....

5. The definition, in all appointing directives to a supreme allied commander, of his authority and responsibilities pertaining to administrative, disciplinary, and operation control over the combined forces placed at his disposal." [Peckham, 48]

"World War I was the cradle of combined operations for the modern age....Combined operations were a persistent dilemma for the Allies. The tortuous development of these operations mirrors the reverses of fortune, the exigencies, and the rise and wane of hopes of the Allied leaders throughout the war." [Agnew, 51] "From the standpoint of combined operations maturation, the war conveniently breaks itself into three distinct phases:

Phase I (4 August 1914-6 November 1917): uncoordinated;

Phase II (7 November 1917-21 March 1918): creation of the Supreme War Council; coordination at government level;

Phase III (22 March-11 November 1918): coordination at military/strategic operation level. [Agnew, 52]

"For the period from 1914 to 1917 there was no over-all Allied strategic plan. Unity of Allied command was achieved only in the final stage of the war, and then it was effective on only one of the four Allied fronts.... The first step toward unity of allied command was the assembly of the Supreme War Council of Allies. The second step was the Doullens Agreement...[which was supplanted by]...the Beauvais Agreement of 3 April 1918, to which the French, British, and the United States governments subscribed. The Beauvais Agreement...[entrusted] to General Foch the strategic direction of military operations. The commanders in chief of the British, French, and American armies have full control of the tactical employment of their forces. Each commander in chief will have the right of appeal to his government, or, in his opinion, the safety of his army is compromised by any order received from General Foch." [Crawford, 49-50]

The allied intervention in North Russia, 1917-1919, provides an excellent example of the perils of combined operations. The failure of the expedition can be attributed primarily to faulty relationships among the major Allied participants, relationships which were determined by several factors; "[a]mong these were: the cloudy command arrangement which caused misunderstanding and resentment, the individual personalities of the military and political leaders involved in the expedition, the basic cultural and social differences between the Allies, and the varied and differing objectives that each nation understood as the reason for military action in North Russia." [Beals, 45-46]

The World War I Allied coalition was very loose. It was much closer and more structured in World War II. [Blumenson, "Coalition Command," 54] "World War II indicated that the demands of prolonged

combat--especially defensive combat--will cause an allied force to become progressively more integrated in its composition." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 3] Perhaps the most integrated of all the Allied Theaters in World War II was Italy where at one time or another the US Fifth Army (part of the Allied 15th Army Group) had some 20 nations represented. General Mark W. Clark commanded troops from the United States, Poland, India, Italy, and Palestine (the Jewish Brigade) as well as the 1st Special Service Force, itself a combined US-Canadian unit. [Clark, *passim*] Reflecting on the mixed composition of his command, General Clark noted in his diary on 4 February 1944: "...I was about ready to agree with Napoleon's conclusion that it is better to fight Allies than be one of them." [Clark, 299] "...[T]he lessons of the Italian campaign taught that once the integrated portion of an allied force reaches one-third to one-half the total strength of the force, its presence will begin to be felt in all functional areas." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 7]

DIFFERENCES IN CULTURE AND OBJECTIVES

Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of any military coalition is that it is composed of two or more allies each with its own language, culture, prejudices, and national objectives. In Italy in 1945, the 15th Army Group commander, General Mark Clark arranged an honor guard for the US Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, consisting of representatives from all nations under his command. "Nothing could have spoken more eloquently than this honor guard of the melding of units from all over the world into the 15th Army Group. In a single glance, he could see the problem of supply, the problem of different languages, the problem of different religions, the whole complex and tangled problem of making it possible for a dozen nationalities to live and fight as one team." [Clark, 424]

It is obvious that these different characteristics of allies may not always be compatible. But, as Forrest Pogue has observed, "It is important to remember that different nations, although allied, have different interest, and that they are not being unfriendly if they pursue those interests." [Pogue, xii] Even so, the historical record suggests that "Overshadowing all other problems, and aggravating them beyond their ordinary dimensions, was that created by national jealousy and pride" [Leighton, 423] On this subject General Omar Bradley noted: "Even in an Allied command where soldiers of several nations engage in a common struggle for survival, judgements are further complicated by a fierce and some times jealous love of country. This cannot be ignored no matter how zealously one may strive to subordinate it to a mutual undertaking. Although this allegiance is keenly developed in the ordinary citizen, it is even more intensively cultivated in the professional soldier who commits his life to the defense of the flag he salutes each day.... Some officers of the American Army were peculiarly insular in there outlook, never having

travelled abroad nor associated professionally with our prospective Allies. As a consequence, some of us were probably unduly sensitive to slights upon our army and our national pride. We were undoubtedly defensive in our attitude toward the British.... Allied command has become the accepted pattern of military operation, and many of the insular differences that once caused us to question the motives of our Allies have now been completely resolved. If we will only remember that from time to time some difficulties do exist, that they occasionally make cooperation difficult, we shall be better prepared to settle them without exaggerating their dangers." [Bradley, x-xi] Thus, it is important to keep in mind that while "the differences and disagreements are of interest to the student because they did happen, and because they are an inevitable part of coalition war....they should not be magnified out of proportion." [Romanus and Sunderland, x]

"Language diversity by itself is not an insurmountable problem of interoperability." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 4] "Language is only the most obvious part of the communication problem. The deeper lying and, perhaps, larger part of the problem in the communication of an idea or concept is phrasing the idea in terms easily understood by someone with a different cultural background....the combined staff leader should undertake to develop an understanding of the national culture of each of the assigned staff members as well as a knowledge of each language." [Thomas, 41]

"To say that commanders must attempt to understand the political and military objectives of their allies has always been a fundamental tenet of the highest level of leadership in coalitions." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 4] "Among the requirements, then, for professional military men in preparation for coalition war are included a study of coalitions as to strengths and weaknesses; a knowledge of government; and a keen study of prospective allies, accompanied by an intense desire to understand them and to determine the best role for each in future war." [Ash, 37]

Aside from the central goals which unite the coalition, the national objectives of the various participants are often in conflict and affect actions taken by combined commanders. "Thus it is mandatory that the commander of multi-national forces at all echelons be not only cognizant of the National Objectives of the Nations whose troops are under his command, but also that all actions be taken in the light of those objectives." [Chapman, 7] "American commanders have always been particularly reluctant to commit their troops to battle for the often chauvinistic objectives of their allies. In World War I General Pershing never refused to obey a legitimate order of the Supreme Allied Commander Marshal Foch, but he did refuse to accept a French staff or to allow the American Army, once formed, to be broken up and amalgamated, and in 1919 he refused to allow the US Army to be used to further French military-political machinations in Luxembourg and on the Rhine." [Conner, 27-28] And in North Africa in 1942-1943 the

French frequently expressed the fear that the friendly relations of American military authorities with the "Arabs" in Morocco were breaking down French influence in the region. "Thus, the US commander in combined operations must recognize the steps taken to solve his local problems will have significant political impact." [Clark 155] Even more serious divergence of political objectives occurred at the end of the war when American political authorities declined to assist the British, French and Dutch in restoring their authority in their Asian possessions.

"In considering the disadvantages of the coalition as a mode of warfare, it is wise to recognize from the beginning that a coalition by its very nature is susceptible to a multiplicity of weakness....The principal problem is to achieve a system of direction wherein the conflicting interests can remain subservient to the overriding common interest to which the coalition is dedicated [the problem of sustained cohesion]. A second disadvantage of coalitions stems from the first. This is the problem of continuous acceptable directorship....The absence of a strong motif for the coalition, however, can well result in each country seeking to preserve its own forces and to attain its individual objectives." [Ash, 35] "The important point for the military student is to recognize that the lack of political unanimity in a coalition war may greatly hamper unity of military effort or direction of military effort." [Ash, 36]

According to Peckham, some of the more important problems of combined command and planning are:

- "1. A divergence of national views as to the development of common national objectives....
2. A divergence of national views as to the employment of combined military forces to accomplish these common objectives....
3. A reluctance of nations to place their entire resources, including armed forces, at the disposal of an alliance.
4. A reluctance of nations to place their armed forces under a commander of another nationality, in belief that national prestige and national interest may thereby be jeopardized.
5. The desire of each nation's forces to occupy an important and responsible position in relation to the other allied forces....
6. The problems resulting from national differences as they pertain to customs, language, law, psychology, culture, and standards of living...." [Peckham, 47-48]

In directing his subordinate commanders and his own combined staff the commander in combined operations must be constantly aware that he is dealing with a wide variety of national character. "...[He] must

bear in mind that he has under command professional soldiers and experience commanders of several nations other than his own, who owe their first allegiance to their own governments and to the views of their own National Chiefs of Staff....Hence, the Theater Commander must first know the several national problems and aspirations in detail before he can hope to deal with his commanders." [Devers, 5]

With respect to the combined staff "[p]erhaps the most obvious problem area concerns the prejudices which grow out of strong national loyalties" [Thomas, 38] and "...the most important thing a section head or chief of staff could have was a true feeling or sensitivity for the way other individuals feel and think." [Thomas 37] Even such frequently unnoticed factors such as pay differentials and differences of social status militate against cohesiveness on a combined staff. [Thomas, 40] Above all, "...the professional ability of the staff members was to be considered above any questions of national bias or friendship....The leader must appreciate that the national military system in which he received his education and training is not the only system, and might not even be the best system." [Thomas, 38]

"When these conflicts of opinion, however, extended to the senior commanders of the armed services of the Allied powers involved, the Theater Commander was confronted with the most delicate problem of reconciling all of them to his own views, in order that he might establish complete harmony in his official family for pursuit of the ultimate decision." [Devers, 7]

Combined operations also add some unique political problems to the commander's other burdens. "The Theater Commander may be conducting operations within the territory of a sovereign nation other than his own, in areas whose laws and customs are other than those of the nationality of the Theater Commander. This presents peculiar problems, especially if the government of the area in which operations are being conducted is one of the Allied powers.... The Mediterranean Theater Commander spent a great amount of his time with the French, North African, and Italian problems, while General Eisenhower was beset by hundreds of problems peculiar to France Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and England." [Devers, 7] In dealing with these problems the theater commander usually has two agents to assist him: 1. a combined planning staff; and 2. the group of political and economic advisors made available to him by the various allied powers...his Political-Economic Advisory Group." [Devers, 7]

One particular aspect of national pride encountered by combined commanders in both World War I and World War II was the insistence that national forces be employed for certain tasks (for example, French forces for the liberation of Paris in 1944) or simply to ensure that the risks of combat were shared. "[After Kasserine]...a consistent attempt was made to share the military risk in proportion to the nationality of the troops available." [Jessup, 16] General Sir Harold Alexander, commander of 15th Army Group in Sicily, controlled both

Patton's US 7th Army and Montgomery's British 8th Army. He gave Montgomery a free hand in planning and assigned the main effort to the British 8th Army thereby regulating US 7th Army to a security mission. "This was not in accordance with the niceties of coalition warfare. For assignments must be made in terms of maintaining an equitable division of effort commensurate with the available national resources and a proportional share of the sacrifices and glory to each national participant." [Blumenson, "Coalition Command," 55-56] Later in Italy the British insisted on participating in Operation SHINGLE (the Anzio landings) because "it was a hazardous venture and heavy casualties might be expected. It was desired that the British and American forces share the hazards in order to offset any undesirable reactions at home if things went unfavorably." [Clark, 254] On the other hand the combined commander with small allied contingents under his command must be alert to the political and morale implications should they suffer a serious defeat. With the Brazilian contingent in Italy in World War II in mind Miranda observed that "...in the case of a nation which possesses only one contingent in the theater, its premature or rapid dissipation can lead to a critical situation. Experience shows that allied tactical commanders, up to the corps level, do not give adequate consideration to this problem." [Miranda, 89] With respect to the 25,000-man Brazilian Expeditionary Force which arrived in Italy in early August 1944, General Mark Clark wrote: "We made plans to integrate them slowly into the Fifth Army. The performance of the Brazilians was, of course, important politically as well as militarily. Brazil was the only Latin American country to send an expeditionary force to take part in the European war, and, naturally, we were eager to give them every chance to make a good showing. At the same time there was considerable difference in their training, and we felt that it was important to go slowly in bringing them into the line. It was always in our minds that a setback for these troops would have an unhappy political reaction in the Americas. The Germans had the same thought in their minds and, ...made efforts to capitalize on the combat inexperience of the South Americans." [Clark, 389-390] Clark later mentioned the difficulty of finding Portuguese-speakers for American tank units attached to the Brazilians.

DIFFERENCES IN MILITARY DOCTRINE, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT

Just as allies differ in language, customs, and political objectives they differ in the organization, training, equipment, and doctrine of their military forces. General Devers cites such differences among the six major problems facing a theater commander in combined operations and notes that "the personnel and logistical status and training level of a particular national force under command will affect the Theater Commander's ability to employ those forces freely and may compel him to commit forces which he had hoped to reserve for another task." [Devers, 11] He also notes that such difference in tactical doctrines and procedures are most critical at the very beginning of an operation. [Devers, 12]

Cooling and Hixson have observed that "The closer national elements of any allied force resemble one another in organization, doctrine, equipment, the less likely they are to experience major problems in interoperability." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 4] They also note that: "Experience has shown that units trained and equipped for liaison, such as artillery units or corps troops, do a better job of working harmoniously with allies than units whose mission does not normally require or include liaison." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 5]

Cooling and Hixson also found that: "individual and unit inexperience militate against the rapid establishment of effective military cooperation....[but that]...units can be trained to work with allies.... Integration of combat units at the division level can be effectively accomplished, given adequate time for the concerned units to prepare for it." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 4-5] "Allied interoperability demands early attention to education, training, and clarification of doctrine. Logically it should begin in peacetime, or at least prior to embarkation upon large-scale operations....Combined training exercises, regardless of the size of units involved, have always been vital to creating a spirit of cooperation and increasing the awareness of all personnel that allies have peculiar needs and mind-sets." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 9-10]

Inevitably, the junior partner in a coalition will perforce to adopt some of the doctrines, methods and equipment of the more senior partner. In World War I the United States was very much a junior, if essential, partner and was equipped largely with French and British equipment. We also adopted training and staff techniques from our allies although without surrendering our belief in a doctrine of open, aggressive warfare. The commander of the A.E.F., General John J. Pershing reported that "Every advantage was taken of the experience of our Allies in training officers. It was early recommended to the War Department that French and British officers be asked to assist in the instruction of troops in the United States. Pending the organization and development of our own schools, a large number of our officers were sent to centers of instruction of the Allied armies. The training of our earlier divisions was begun in close association with the French divisions...." [United States Army, A.E.F., Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, 13] "From careful studies of the systems and actual participation by our officers in methods in use at various Allied headquarters, an intelligence Services was evolved in our forces which operated successfully from its first organization in August, 1917....The secret service, espionage and counterespionage, was organized in close cooperation with the French and British." [United States Army, A.E.F., Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, 16]

However, Pershing insisted that US troops be trained for offensive, open warfare (thus the continued emphasis on rifle marksmanship practice) rather than for defensive (trench) warfare as recommended by

the French and British. "The system of training profoundly influenced the combat efficiency of our troops by its determined insistence upon an offensive doctrine and upon training in warfare of movement." [United States Army, A.E.F., Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, 15]

In World War II the United States was much more of an equal partner, if not in fact the leader, in the coalition, and differences in British and American concepts of command and staff operations were of some concern. "...[T]here was a profound divergence of opinion and custom between Britain and the United States with respect to the role of a field commander. American tradition favored a broad delegation of responsibility and authority to a commander, on the principle that he should be assigned a job, given the means to do it, and held responsible for its fulfillment without scrutiny of the measures employed....The British High Command, by contrast, kept a vigilant check on its commanders, with little regard to channels of command....This illustrated what Eisenhower once referred to as 'the inevitable trend of the British mind toward 'committees' rather than 'single' command.'" [Leighton, 412] Also, "there was a strong feeling among many American military men that a field commander, no matter how exalted, should personally direct the battle. The British, by contrast, appeared to envisage for the Supreme Commander in the European invasion the more aloof role of coordinator, with a small headquarters concerned primarily with political matters and liaison." [Leighton, 418]

Significant differences also existed with respect to the organization and functions of military staffs. General Clark, Eisenhower's deputy in North Africa noted that: "In a broad way, our work in that period, and later, keenly felt the differences between American and British methods, regardless of Ike's strenuous efforts to coordinate the two teams. The British favored large staff conferences and committee meetings. When a decision had to be reached, the British procedure was to have a conference where all interested agencies were represented. The subject was thoroughly discussed by each representative. These meetings were long and tiresome, and usually resulted in delayed decisions or none at all. The American system used a more direct approach. The commander uses his staff officers to give him advice, usually individually and not in large open meetings, and after receiving their various recommendations and points of view, made his decision and published it for the information of and implementation by all concerned....Ike succeeded in overcoming the differences between these two systems to a great extent; though as a result of his effort to be impartial naturally some of the concessions were from the American side." [Clark, 65]

Reuben E. Jenkins, G-3 of the US 6th Army Group in World War II later observed that the British method was to place territorial and administrative burdens on their Army Group headquarters resulting in excess staff and duplication of effort. The British 15th Army Group

in North Africa, Sicily and the first two months in Italy was relatively small (85 officers) with the British Chief Administrative Officer and British special staff at Theater headquarters taking care of most administrative matters. Headquarters, 15th Army Group, expanded in Italy, but the US Fifth Army headquarters did not go along with the British expansion of responsibility. Thus, there was:

1. No increase in personnel in Headquarters, US Fifth Army;
2. No duplication of effort between Headquarters, Fifth Army Peninsula Base Section, and NATOUSA;
3. A tremendous increase in British personnel requirements;
4. Duplication of effort between Headquarters, 15th Army Group, and British Ninth Army and the British Chief Administrative Officer and special staff in Algiers.

General Jacob L. Devers, the US 6th Army Group commander, and Reuben E. Jenkins, his G-3, worked to keep down the size of Headquarters, US 6th Army Group, based on having seen what happened to the British 15th Army Group headquarters in Italy. [Letter, Reuben E. Jenkins to Colonel Robert N. Young (School of Combined Arms, USACGSC), 28 January 1947, subject: Functions of Army Group G-3, page 1, Carlisle Barracks, PA, USAMHI Archives, Reuben E. Jenkins Collection, Folder 3] Even so, in the last 6th Army Group campaign in March 1945 there were over 1 million men deployed in active, full-scale operations. The G-3 section had 37 officers and 43 EM and HQ, 6th Army Group, as a whole had 204 officers and 346 EM. The total HQ, 6th Army Group (including military government, psyops, and other scattered personnel), comprised some 311 officers and 1221 EM. [Letter, Reuben E. Jenkins to Colonel Robert N. Young (School of Combined Arms, USACGSC), 28 January 1947, subject: Functions of Army Group G-3, page 11, Carlisle Barracks, PA, USAMHI Archives, Reuben E. Jenkins Collection, Folder 3]

DIFFERENCES IN LOGISTICS

General Devers states that one of the problems facing the theater commander in combined operations involves "[t]he logistical capabilities, organization, doctrines, and characteristics of each of the armed forces under command." [Devers, 7] He goes on to observe that: "It has been said by many great leaders that they always took at least five looks to their rear for every look to their front. It may well be said that a Combined Theater Commander may well take five looks to the logistics of each of the armed services of each of the allied powers under command for each look he takes to the front...and...[w]hile in the main the difference in tactical concepts can always be adjusted between the various armed services locally, the opposite is true of administrative and logistical concepts." [Devers, 8]

Although "...the greatest problems facing allied staffs may well concern supply and logistics...[and]...[h]ost nation agreements, national economics and accountability for shared material, as well as the functional arrangements for supply, will all prove troublesome," [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 5] "...little information is available on the logistical implications of ...combined operations." [Conn, 27]

General Williston B. Palmer has stated that "...the most important of all these facts of life...is the fact that the United States has based its first line of defense overseas....Well, then, if we are going to be ready to fight overseas, every commander has to prepare himself to cope with beachhead supply; and with military ports; and with the utilization of indigenous labor from the water's edge to the front line; and with organizing, equipping, and training indigenous troops; and with feeding the population; and with providing locally for the repair and rebuilding of his worn-out military equipment; and eventually with rebuilding the railroads, highways, wire communications and public utilities of a foreign country....The American policy of establishing its defense line overseas has a vastly important corollary. You always have to provide logistic support for dependent allies." [Palmer, 6-8]

In World War I the United States was the recipient of such support, but since 1941 the United States has been the principal supplier for her allies. In combined operations "[o]rganization for supply usually presents the greatest difficulties because the force of different nations will have different types of equipment....[T]he maximum flexibility [must] be provided for moving services, such as Engineer, Medical and Signal units...from one part of the front to another, and making them available to implement the major effort." [Smith, 458-459] Britt observes that "[t]he coordination of logistics in [a] combined force [is] facilitated by having a completely integrated combined staff for the supreme commander." [Britt, 46] He also notes that "...standardization of equipment must precede any large-scale standardization of organization, tactics, or logistical procedures." [Britt, 50]

Most commentators argue for the concept of a balanced combined force rather than commitment of balanced forces from each country (i.e. each country should not necessarily provide all necessary supporting forces for their units). [Scott, 14] The Brazilian Miranda argues, for example, that "1. All military equipment should be supplied by the nations with whom we shall cooperate; 2. When the nation providing the expeditionary forces does not have its forces equipped with the same type of material that will be used by the other allied forces, adequate time must be provided so that the expeditionary force can be trained properly in the use of such material." [Miranda, 88]

Scott and others note that the present fundamental doctrine in all military alliances in which the US participates is that "each nation has sole responsibility for logistical support of its military forces."

[Scott, 5] Scott goes on to say that very little authority is provided the combined force commander in the field of logistics and, although without "ownership authority", the combined commander "still must erect effective control and his logistics team must have broad knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of each national logistical system." [Scott, 5]

General Devers points out that "[w]hile basic decisions regarding supply and maintenance logistics are certainly the province of the Theater Commander, detailed implementation of these basic decisions must remain a prescription of the senior commander of the armed forces of the allied powers concerned...He [the Theater Commander] is principally concerned with the capacity of each of the armed services of the allied powers involved to maintain itself in accordance with the standards commensurate with its own combat requirements, and with the overall demands of the campaign. He must not limit the operational capabilities of the armed services of any of the nations involved by the arbitrary diversion of its logistical support to the armed services of another nation, unless the tactical situation clearly demands this action." [Devers, 9]

Scott observes that the theater and allied logistics problems have control of assets as their basic factor. [Scott, ii] General Bradley noted that supply allocations between the US 12th Army Group and the British 21 Army Group were a part of the combined commander's (Eisenhower's) duties and problems. [Bradley, passim] However, in the ETO SHAEF did not interfere with the US Services of Supply or the British War Office. SHAEF G-4 was restricted by directive to the following:

1. Preparation of outline administrative plans
2. Inter-nation and inter-service coordination
3. Policy as to relation to other nations
4. Construction standards
5. Allocation of items in short supply
6. POL allocations [Skillman, 17]

Nevertheless, "...SHAEF did enter into allocation of items in short supply and of P.O.L." [Skillman, 17]

Cooling and Hixson found that: "Close control must be exercised over critical items of equipment and special units, for example, in order to ensure "fair distribution," availability, and maximum effective utilization. Combat Service Support must be prepared to support, within their capability, all allied units operating in their area of responsibility." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 9]

In summary of these points Skillman concludes that:

"1. The rights and laws of the sovereign nations who provide the component forces and logistic resources for an Allied command operate to restrict the authority of an Allied commander...to exercise control over logistical activities.

2. The command level of an Allied commander...inherently limits the degree and extent of control over logistical activities.

3. An Allied commander...must insure effective planning for logistic support of his forces and the complete coordination of such logistic support.

4. In order to insure effective logistic support of a major Allied offensive, the Allied commander...should control the following minimum essential logistical activities:

a. Allocation among subordinate commands of the use of the Allied command infrastructure.

b. Allocation among subordinate commands of resources and supplies of common use available to him which are critical or in short supply (e.g. - POL, ammunition for common weapons, transportation means, etc.).

c. In emergencies, diversion of logistic resources and supplies from the subordinate command for which intended to another subordinate command where urgently required.

d. Allocation of lines of communication, and control of movements thereon when demanded by the situation.

e. Determination of stock levels and general location of reserve stocks.

f. Submission of reports on status of supplies and facilities." [Skillman, 3-4]

Scott adds that the combined commander must be given some procurement authority and must constitute a system of reports and policies which provide a continuous knowledge of the support ability of each national communication zone system. [Scott, 14] He also notes that "[w]hile national combat elements will probably be separated into their own zones of operation the logistics elements will do considerable intermingling." [Scott, 7]

Britt finds it worth mentioning that in World War I little was done in the way of coordinating logistics until the situation became critical; the Military Board of Allied Supply was created to

"systemize" supply relations between the Allies and became operational only at the end of May 1918. [Britt, 44] General Pershing himself wrote that "...in the summer of 1918 the General Purchasing Agent became a member of the International Board of Supplies. This Board undertook, with signal success, to coordinate the supply of the Allied armies in all those classes of material necessities that were in common use in all the armies. The possibility of immense savings were fully demonstrated, but the principals had to become of general application before the Armistice." [United States Army, A.E.F., Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, 67]

Coordination was better in World War II due to the experience of both the British and Americans in World War I. [Britt, 45] Although the general principle was for the maintenance of separate systems of supply and separate logistical staffs in combined headquarters, there were some examples in World War II of integrated supply headquarters. "It was during [the] planning phase [for Operation DRAGOON, the invasion of southern France] that the first integration with French logistical forces took place." [Conn, 27] An SOP issued by French-United States elements of Coastal Base Section, dated 4 August 1944, provided that "3. In so far as proves practicable, the general policy will be to have US troops handle supplies for US forces and French troops handle supplies for French forces; however, it must be recognized that the sole mission of the combined base is to support combined operations regardless of nationality." [Conn, 28] This SOP paved the way, but complete integration [of the US Coastal Base Section and French Base 90] did not occur until October 1944. "With the issuance of General Order 27 [HQ, First French Army, 23 October 1944], the French became an integral part of the Continental Advance Section operating personnel from the headquarters staff to the service units, and French officers were assigned to position vacancies in accordance with their respective ranks. As appropriate to an officer's rank or assigned position, that officer commanded those troops available for his mission, whether American or French." [Conn, 29-30] Even so, French Base 901 continued in existence for three reasons:

1. As an administrative headquarters for matters purely French, such as G-1 problems;
2. To purchase for and supply the entire French First Army with such items of supply as could be procured from local sources in France;
3. To supply some 50,000 FFI members not covered under agreements with the US [Conn, 30]

Conn also notes that: "By means of the integrated staff, the task of interpreting United States Army policies and techniques so that the supply sections of the French First Army were able to fit into French

supply procedures, was made easier." [Conn, 30] And, "[t]o get the best possible results, all [signal] construction and repair facilities were pooled. However, it became necessary, because of language difficulties, to establish two telephone and telegraph exchanges in order to get the best possible service" [Conn, 31]

Both Britt and Scott come to some summary conclusions regarding the problems of logistics in combined operations. With regard to the experience of World War II Britt concludes:

"1. The principal obstacles to the coordination of logistics among the allies have their roots in finances. Generally speaking, the more impecunious the ally, the more difficult the solution to the problem, unless resort is made to grants.

2. Problems are not confined to relationships between the US and her allies; Germans had similar problems in World Wars I and II.

3. The British have been generally successful in handling such problems; their methods deserve study.

4. Some over-all authority, other than a committee, is essential for the coordination of logistics in a coalition.

5. Lack of proper coordination can spell disaster.

6. It seems risky to commit combat reserves for cross-servicing, unless the stockages reflect a cross-servicing requirement.

7. Some form of military aid such as lend-lease or MDAP seems better than cross-servicing in the combat areas.

8. Due consideration must be given to allied customs and standards.

9. Standardization is a prerequisite for broad pooling of resources." [Britt, 51]

With respect to the more recent period Scott concludes:

"1. That the present world tension objective of the allied nations does not provide a proper basis for determining the extent of logistic assistance the United States must provide in future war to other nations nor for the determining the amount of control over US logistic assets it must relinquish to international agencies, the combined force commander, or to the individual allied nations.

2. That a balanced force concept for combined forces is essential to the efficient use of the operational capabilities, in major war, of each nation and is the best basis for determining requirements which will be placed against the United States by allies.

3. That a balanced logistic concept is the most economical and desirable method for the United States participation in logistic support of combined forces.

4. That the combined force commander and his forces will require for advice and operational guidance a considerable number of US logistic officers since the United States is the nation with the greatest experience and capability in large-scale logistic support.

5. That highly qualified US military logistic officers are scarce at present but this shortage can be quickly corrected.

6. That the present logistic functions of several US national agencies other than military makes necessary a determination of the logistic functions in support of allies for which the military logistic systems will be responsible in war.

7. That maintenance, both in technical aspects and spare parts supply, has become a problem which will impose serious operational limitations unless corrected.

8. That there will be a necessity for international control of certain critical material during major war and the US must determine what control of its assets will be relinquished to such agencies." [Scott, 24-25]

Finally, Smith notes that: "Problems of medical supply and the evacuation of wounded cause a Commander more concern than any others....It was General Eisenhower's policy in all his campaigns that there was no nationality where our wounded were concerned." [Smith, 459]

POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC DIRECTION

General Devers cites as one of the major problems facing a theater commander in combined operations the "[c]haracteristic lack of clarity and firmness of directives received from the next superior combined headquarters or authority. [Devers, 3] Cooling and Hixson have also noted that "Interoperability in command can profitably begin with clarity and simplicity of orders and directives." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 5]

Not only must the directives from higher authority be clear and direct, the combined commander must interpret them correctly and pass them on in firm and clear directives and orders of his own. Citing the example of the timing of the Normandy invasion, General Devers observed that "The first task of the Theater Commander upon receipt of a directive from the next higher commander or authority is, of course, to arrive at its correct, sound interpretation, in the light of the

conditions under which the directive was issued, and in the light of the conditions existing in the theater at the time of its receipt." [Devers, 4] Nor were the theater commander's plans without further review by higher authority. "Every plan of campaign developed by a theater commander had to be reviewed in the light of its impact on the whole military situation, and it was usually the High Command which made the decision as to which operations within a theater should receive the needed allotment of precious resources....The theater commander, in fact, could scarcely be expected to have a real perspective of the whole war or of its own theater's place in it; he was inevitably disqualified, therefore, from being sole judge of his own needs." [Leighton, 415]

One of the few American field commanders in the Twentieth Century to be given virtually free reign by his superiors was General John J. Pershing, the Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in France in World War I. As Martin Blumenson has noted, "Pershing commanded only American troops in Europe. No other theaters competed for American resources. And the imperfect state of communications, making close touch between France and Washington impossible, required virtually complete independence on Pershing's part." [Blumenson, "Eisenhower," 45] As he left for France in May 1917 General Pershing was in fact provided with two letters of instructions, both dated 26 May 1917 and both worth quoting here. The first letter, from Acting Chief of Staff Major General Tasker H. Bliss stated: "The Secretary of War further directs that, upon your arrival in France, you establish such relations with the French Government and the military representatives of the British Government now serving in France as will enable you effectively to plan and conduct active operations in conjunction and in cooperation with the French armies operating in France against Germany and her allies." [Baker and Bliss, Letters, 1] The other letter, from Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and transmitting the instructions of President Woodrow Wilson, read: "The President directs me to communicate to you the following:....In military operations against the Imperial German Government you are directed to cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against that enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as your judgement may approve....But, until the forces of the United States are in your judgement sufficiently strong to warrant operations as an independent command, it is understood that you will cooperate as a component of whatever army you may be assigned to by the French Government." [Baker and Bliss, Letters, 1]

"Pershing's orders from Secretary of War Newton Baker placed the AEF commander at odds with the other principal Allied commanders....Pershing was unyielding in his opposition to the Allied

wish to use Americans as individual replacements or as small unit reinforcements. Petain and Haig were equally as obdurate in their demands that American units be fragmented and integrated into Allied formations....Thus, an impasse developed which would frustrate the achievement of Allied command unity for nearly a year." [Agnew, 55] Once in France the lack of a clear chain of command and clear directives proved troublesome to General Pershing as the chief representative of the junior partner in the coalition of 1917-1919. The "[c]ommand problems were essentially military and they often involved American units under Allied training or operational control endured an awkward duality of command. Allied leaders gave orders which must be obeyed, but American commanders had, also, to report activities to Pershing's GHQ. Black Jack's disapproval cancelled Allied orders. This kind of divided authority never works; jealousies, irritations, were frequent--Allied commanders sometimes delayed orders to their American brethren until too late for referral to Pershing!" [Vandiver, "The AEF and the French Connection, 1917-1918," 14 (Paper M, International Commission on Military History, Forces Armees et Systemes d'Alliance" - Colloquy, 2-7 September 1981)]

The first Allied combined command to be organized after US entry into World War II was a model of "how not to do it." The directive for General Sir Archibald Wavell as Supreme Allied Commander, American-British-Dutch-Australian Command, "contained a curious duality. Wavell was given command both of a certain area and of certain forces, that is, the "ABDA area" and "All armed forces" of the ABDA governments within that area....This arrangement was full of potential jurisdictional conflict." [Leighton, 407]

The World War II Allied practice of dividing the world into combined theaters and spheres of interest indeed caused problems. "These regional arrangements inevitably raised jurisdictional problems in the "border" area between national spheres. In Southeast Asia, for example, the boundary between American and British spheres ran roughly along the eastern frontier of Burma. In China, which thus fell within the American sphere, Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell had the title of Chief of Staff to the Chinese Generalissimo--one of the "five hats" which this busy officer wore. Outside China, Stilwell was also field commander of the Chinese troops which he trained in India; in this capacity, though operating in the British sphere, he was independent of British authority. As American theater commander, Stilwell had jurisdiction over all American forces in China, Burma, and India; in Burma, from late 1943, he was deputy to the Allied Supreme Commander, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten." [Leighton, 408-409]

The Allied Southeast Asia Command and the US China-Burma-India Theater were certainly the most complex and perhaps least effective of the wartime allied command arrangements and frequently provided examples of confused chains of command and even more confusing directives despite the best efforts of the Supreme Allied Commander, Lord Louis Mountbatten, and his American subordinates.

"The significant feature of coalition warfare is command and control of multinational forces which have conflicting national interest, disparate military doctrines, and different languages. While successful direction of combined operations depends upon a number of natural factors, there are three discrete but interdependent manmade factors which play a decisive role in the conduct of such operations:

- An agreed strategy...to which parties in the coalition will submerge their national interests....

- Translating the coalition strategy, or strategies, into action, or how the governments and their general staffs direct the combined and national component commanders in the field, keep them advised of coalition concepts, and coordinate the activities of the various national forces....

- The structure for command and control within the area of operations which concerns the composition of the field headquarters, the authority delegated to coalition and national commanders, areas of responsibility and provision for coordination between commands....

World War II operations of the Chinese, British, and American forces in China, Burma, and India provide a classic example for the interplay of these factors, illustrating the inevitable consequences of inadequate strategic guidance and poorly designed command apparatus." [Canella, 55-56]

"These divergent strategies were compounded rather than ameliorated by the mechanics of high command at the governmental level....The US CBI theater answered to the War Department; the British India Command answered to the Viceroy of India. Of the two Allied and three national commands, therefore none answered to the same authority, and not one was responsible directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff---the very instrument which had been established to direct and coordinate Allied war effort....The command structure in the CBI area was possibly the most complex and confusing ever developed; it was characterized by overlapping responsibilities, multiple appointments of individuals to different and conflicting tasks, and exceptions to established chains of command procedures." [Canella, 58-59]

"In addition to commanding the Chinese forces, Chiang [Kai-shek] was also supreme commander of the Chinese theater [but reported to no one in that capacity]....The original concept of the Chinese theater held that Chiang would command American and British as well as Chinese troops that operated in the China theater which, for all practical purposes, was confined to China Proper." [Canella, 60] General Joseph Stilwell was the only member of the joint staff for the "China Theater" ever appointed. His role as Chief of Staff, China Theater, involved him in several contradictory situations: competition with the Chief of Staff of the Chinese army; no joint/combined planning staff; the determination of when Stilwell was acting as Chiang's Chief of Staff and when he was acting as an American theater commander. [Canella, 61]

In point of fact, "[t]he CBI theater came about by default, rather than by formal designation. US orders were never promulgated establishing a CBI theater, although Stilwell's headquarters and the War Department began to refer to it as such...." [Canella, 63]

By contrast General Eisenhower, both as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, in North Africa, and as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, in Europe, was blessed with relatively clear, if purposefully vague, directives. "In operation TORCH---invasion of North Africa--Eisenhower as Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Forces, was responsible to the combined chiefs of staff and received all his directives from that body. He was authorized direct communication with joint staffs of both countries and was given supreme command of all forces---Army, Navy, and Air. His basic directive from the combined chiefs specifically stipulated adherence to the principle of unity of command. The traditional right of appeal by a national commander to his own government was practically eliminated....In Operation OVERLOAD, the combined chiefs, pursuant to directives of their heads of state, designated General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces. In this command all forces were grouped by service component, rather than by national groupings." [Ash, 34] Even so there were areas of significant potential misunderstanding. "As American theater commander, Eisenhower was of course in charge of all rear-area activities in the same area...[and]...Eisenhower's Allied Force Headquarters was thus, not the "capital" of a territorial theater, but a control center for operations in a vaguely defined zone straddling the boundary between national spheres of responsibility." [Leighton, 409-410] Furthermore, General Mark W. Clark, deputy to Eisenhower for TORCH, noted that disagreements over TORCH at the governmental level greatly complicated the planning process, requiring the combined staff planners to develop two plans simultaneously until the upper level decisions were finally made. [Clark, 52-53] Clark, who was immersed in political and administrative matters regarding the French in North Africa and who himself later commanded an extremely diverse allied force in Italy (US Fifth Army and then 15th Army Group) constantly lamented the lack of policy direction and detailed policy (such as provided to the British by their government) provided to US commanders. [Tripp, 13] Clark repeatedly stated the premise that US commanders in the field never were given sufficient policy guidance as to ultimate war aims and cites the case of the missed opportunity to move through Yugoslavia into Czechoslovakia early. [Tripp, 17]

THE COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF IN COMBINED OPERATIONS

GENERAL

Central to the task of the theater commander in combined operations is the organization of his command and his staff to perform effectively and efficiently in the combined environment. The key issue in this respect throughout the Twentieth Century has been the degree to which

Supreme Allied Commanders have been able to achieve "unity of command" and exercise the full range of a commander's prerogatives. Also important to a full understanding of the problem is an understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the theater commander in combined operations and of the personal characteristics required of a successful allied commander. Each of these topics are addressed below.

None of the problems of a combined commander are insoluble, but many of them are difficult and complex. Major General Harold Bull, SHAEF G-3, noted: "I can truly testify from my own experience that solving the problems of combined command in war is simpler and more expeditious than solving the joint problems in our national defense establishment in peace....the basic essential to successful combined planning and operations, from the theater level down...is unity of purpose of the command. It is a mental attitude....a common accepted objective in the war effort." [Bull, 1]

World War I ended before all of the many problems of combined operations were fully worked out, especially from the American point of view. In World War II such problems were indeed solved satisfactorily in North Africa, the Mediterranean and Europe but less so in Southeast Asia and China. "The situation in World War II was unique in that the two principal collaborating nations in Western Europe had as nearly perfect conditions as possible (i.e. - common language, common interest and objectives, political leaders in agreement, similar command and staff organizations and procedures, and similar tactical organization and doctrine)." [Paulick, 54] Indeed, the common language and culture of the two great allies, Britain and America, as well as their closely related objectives, were most important to their success. One writer has gone so far as to say that SHAEF "could not have worked unless British and Americans spoke the same language." [Bauer, 22]

Unfortunately, the same ideal conditions did not obtain in Southeast Asia. "The unique difficulties of coalition warfare and combined command were generally recognized. In the case of SEAC, those difficulties would be compounded by other factors, including the stresses of operating thousands of miles from bases of supply, in a theater of relatively low strategic priority, in disease-ridden lands of often hostile natives, abominable climate, and near-impossible terrain. To the inevitable tensions arising from distinctive national styles were added those rooted (at levels customarily beneath the surface of military discourse) in divergent political goals. Service rivalries and personal antagonisms within and among the Allied camps presented further complications: ground, sea, and air officers differed in their strategic outlooks; deeply rooted suspicions marred relations between the British and Chinese; the American commander, General Stilwell, was at odds with almost everyone, including British commander-in-chief General Wavell and other British officers, Chiang Kai Shek in China, and the US commander of the Flying Tigers, Major

General Claire L. Chennault. Such was the setting in which SEAC was born in the autumn of 1943 and given the task of organizing more effective Allied resistance to a resourceful and aggressive enemy." [Eiler, 68]

THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMBINED COMMAND

"The organization of the interior command structure for the combined theater of operations is the responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander." [Peckham, 50] "Regardless of the type of command structure developed for a combined theater of operations, it must be capable of meeting three principal requirements. These are:

1. The supreme commander must have the ability of exercising unified command over all allied forces placed at his disposal.

2. The forces should normally be employed under the military commanders of their own respective nations, thus providing increased harmony and facility of employment as well as retaining national prestige of senior allied commanders. As previously indicated, this requirement is further conditioned by logistical considerations.

3. The supreme commander must have the ability to mass allied forces by type, at critical times and in critical areas, without regard to nationality." [Paulick, 56]

In World War II "the pattern for the command structure for US forces in Europe, both strategic and logistical, was taken from World War I experience. Indeed, the terms of reference for both Generals Eisenhower and Lee were drafted from the Letters of Instruction to General Pershing in 1917 and 1918." [Britt, 45] The normal territorial organization in World War II was the mono-national sector. [Hixson, Eisenhower, 21] "During World War II, numerous Army theater commands were formed, including, for example, US Army Forces in the China Theater of Operations, Burma, and India; and the European Theater of Operations, US Army. Additionally, field commands were established during World War II which included US and allied forces, such as Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa; and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces." [Stuckey, 40]

"The Allied theater of 1942-1945 is difficult to describe in the conventional terms of administrative organization; for it was not, properly speaking, a territorial or an administrative unit at all, although it had certain functions which most nonmilitary laymen would call administrative. Its territorial boundaries were usually vaguely defined, and territorial jurisdiction was not in any case an essential feature of its mission. Military administration within the area of an Allied theater, in fact, was primarily the function of the national forces, organized in clearly demarcated national theaters. Yet these

national theaters, though they served a common strategy in a given region, were not integral parts of the Allied theater. They stood, in a sense, apart from it, and comprehended jurisdictional areas, both territorial and functional, over which the Allied commander had no control. The national theater was an extension of the national military organization into overseas areas, closely controlled by the national military authorities at home. In the coalition structure it served primarily to provide and organize the forces and other means essential for coordinated Allied operations in its geographical area. The role of the Allied theater centered in its headquarters and above all in its "supreme" commander. Its proper function was command, in the special and limited form---unity of command---which this traditional military function assumed when transplanted to the soil of a coalition." [Leighton, 400-401]

"Perhaps the first consideration within the combined theater of operations affecting the command structure is that of territorial organization. This consideration is closely interwoven with matters of logistics, and other purely national military matters such as training, existing military organization, existing tactical and staff doctrines and procedures, and the like." [Paulick, 55] "The organization of coalition thus developed along parallel lines through the principle of unified command the system of spheres of national responsibility....Despite its dependence upon regional organization, Allied unified command was always primarily concerned with control of forces rather than territory, and it shunned as far as possible the administrative jurisdiction which was inseparable from territorial control. This remained the province of the national theater organizations" [Leighton, 410-411] Significantly, Smith notes the importance of what he calls the "Twilight Zones", the boundaries between Army Groups/different national forces which require the special attention of the Supreme/Theater commander who frequently is obliged to supervise activities on those boundaries personally. [Smith, 458]

Commenting on more recent patterns of command arrangements Stuckey notes that "the exact command structure in combined operations is established by international agreements, but it must be assumed that the standard arrangement will give the combined land forces commander operational control of Army combat forces. Command less operational control would likely be exercised by a US unified command through its Army component," [Stuckey, 45] He then goes on to say: "When a combined operation is undertaken without establishing a combined command, operational control is exercised by each allied nation over its forces. With US forces, operational control is by the unified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or other special arrangement." [Stuckey, 45-46].

Stuckey also observes that: "Theater operations, whether directed by a US joint command or a combined command, need an Army echelon directly above the corps having command of the Army forces.

Operational control by the theater commander of Army forces should be the Army EAC." [Stuckey, 46] A similar point was made by Miranda based on the experience of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy in World War II: "It is essential to organize a high command, independent from the command of the combat force itself, even though this force may be small and even if it is not supported by other elements of the same nationality...the high command would be able to take care of all problems on the higher echelons of command (allied staffs), and the division or combat force commander would be able to concentrate most of his efforts on the tactical aspects of the operation." [Miranda, 87] Miranda also notes that: "In organizing an expeditionary force, it must not be forgotten that it should be composed of integrated combat and service units...[and]...a replacement depot in the theater...[T]he number of replacements should be maintained at an adequate level to provide sufficient replacements for a predetermined time...." [Miranda, 85]

The European Theater of Operations under General Eisenhower was perhaps the most effectively organized theater of World War II. The testing ground was North Africa and Eisenhower himself noted that in North Africa "While plans called for eventual organization of American and British ground forces each under its own commander, directly responsible to me, the initial assault was foreseen as a single battle, closely interrelated in all its parts, and requiring the supervision of a single battle-line commander. All agreed on this necessity." [SHAEF, Eisenhower's Own Story of the War, 6] In North Africa, "unlike the naval command structure, the Allied commander had no subordinate unified command of the ground forces. General Eisenhower directly controlled the ground forces of both countries....In addition to his job as Allied Commander, Eisenhower doubled as commander of all US Army troops participating in TORCH." [Franks, 23-24] British ground forces were under LTG Sir Kenneth A. N. Anderson who reported directly to General Eisenhower. "By the end of the Sicilian campaign...his [Eisenhower's] command structure had become remarkably similar to the ideal one that he had outlined to the British Chiefs in the summer of 1942. Alexander (like Anderson before him) had charge only of ground forces in actual operations. Eisenhower remained the over-all ground commander." [Chandler]

General Eisenhower retained the same basic system as Supreme Allied Commander in Northwest Europe. He decided against having a "Ground Commander-in-Chief" and retained that role himself [Bauer, 14] and described the situation thus: "In the initial phases of OVERLORD, Field Marshal Montgomery, whom I had designated as tactical commander of the early land battles, was to have operational control of all land forces, including the United States First Army until the growing build-up of the American forces made desirable the establishment of an independent Army Group." [SHAEF, Eisenhower's Own Story of the War, 7] Field Marshal Montgomery's 21 Army Group planned and directed both US and British ground forces on the Continent until the 1st US Army

Group took command of the US forces in France, but the combination of British and US forces under 21 Army Group was a temporary measure and no truly integrated staff was created. [Bauer, 23-25]

"From the time of the break-out in France, when the first American Army group was activated, until the end of the war, Eisenhower directed ground operations through the subordinate national army group commanders. The Eisenhower philosophy of command organization prevails in NATO today and US doctrine concerning combined commands does not make provisions for an overall ground commander subordinate to the Commander in Chief." [Jessup, 22] As to question of why there was no ground Commander-in-Chief in the ETO (other than Eisenhower himself) Eisenhower's Chief of Staff "Beetle" Smith noted that "When the ground front is such that its configuration and extent permit close battle supervision by a single Army Group Commander, then this officer is also the "Ground Commander" of the whole Force. But when the extent of the front necessitates more than one Army Group in a single theater, there cannot logically be an over-all Ground Commander separate from the Supreme or Theater Commander." [Smith, 457] As Supreme Allied Commander General Eisenhower retained direct unified command over the Allied army groups himself. "As a result, the dividing line between the functions of SHAEF and Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETOUSA), was not clearly established." [Paulick, 52] Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff later expressed the opinion that an overall commander of ground forces would have hastened the end of the war. He believed that Eisenhower had too much to do and his headquarters was frequently too far away from tactical control. Americans, he stated, would not have accepted a British overall ground force commander, but the British would have accepted General Omar Bradley. Overall, however, Lord Alanbrooke was convinced that the Allied set-up was a very good one and did not think he would change for another war. [Interview by Forrest Pogue with FM Viscount Alanbrooke (former CIGS), 28 January 1947, Carlisle Barracks, PA, USAMHI Archives, OCMH Collection, Box: Supreme Command, Folder: Interviews by Forrest Pogue, 1946-1947]

"Beetle" Smith was not alone in observing that: "How the chain of command will function below that level [i.e. - level of the Supreme Commander] is even more important." [Smith, 456] "In a well-ordered command the three service commanders in chief 'must each have a great degree of independence in his own field. Without a great degree of decentralization no allied command can be made to work.' On the other hand, the commanders and their staffs must be physically near the supreme commander so that there can be constant close personal contact." [Chandler] According to Jessup: "Eisenhower considered that the air, ground and sea commanders occupied two roles," and he quotes General Eisenhower: 'In the first role each was a part of my staff and he and his assistants worked with us in the development of plans: In the second role each was the responsible commander for executing his part of the whole operation.' [Jessup, 21; see also Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 221]

Although the command structure in the European Theater was complex, it was reasonably effective. The same could not be said of other theaters. Command arrangements in Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command were particularly complex and unsatisfactory. "By almost any standards, the direction of military operations in CBI-SEAC violated the basic concepts of management and rules of war. Perhaps the most flaunted fundamental concept was that of mission or purpose which, although basic to any military or non-military enterprise, was here subordinated to national considerations....Another basic rule of management requires a recognized center of direction. There was no such center at the political level or within the military chiefs of the alliance. In the actual area of operations, control authority was even more clearly missing; there was no individual or agency anywhere with the responsibility to coordinate operations. As a direct result, four major commanders---Chiang, Mountbatten, Stilwell, and Chennault---submitted conflicting concepts of operations to the Combined Chiefs and to the Allied councils....A third critical principle of management demands an organizational structure with a clear demarcation of task and provision for internal coordination. It is self-evident that in this case the structure was complicated, functions not clearly understood, and there was no adequate provision for internal coordination....The entire system of control failed to meet two basic propositions of high command---centralized direction and decentralized execution." [Canella, 70-71] The result was that SEAC was not able to mount significant operations until 1945. Although location, terrain, priorities, and other factors influenced the command structure in SEAC perhaps the major factor in SEAC's problems was the multiplicity of tasks assigned to one of the key commanders, US General Joseph Stilwell. At one and the same time Stilwell held the following positions:

- Commanding General, US Army Forces, China-Burma-India Theater of Operations
- Deputy Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command
- Commanding General, Chinese Army in India (a corps; under Field Marshal Slim)
- Commanding General, Northern Combat Area Command
- Allied Chief of Staff, China Theater [i.e. - to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek] [Romanus and Sunderland, ix]

Quite obviously General Stilwell was spread rather thin, and his vinegary personality did not smooth matters. Although Stilwell was the Number Two man in SEAC, as CG, Chinese Army in India, he was a corps commander with two divisions and would normally have been under General Sir George Giffard (CG CINC, 11th Army Group) and General Slim (GOC, Fourteenth Army) but Stilwell had no confidence in Giffard and agreed

only to serve as a corps commander under Slim for whom he had the greatest faith and respect. [Romanus and Sunderland, 28-29] The situation was ameliorated some what by the replacement of General Stilwell by General Albert C. Wedemeyer who as Chief of Staff, China Theater, sought to improve relations with Chiang Kai-shek, improve the Chinese Army, and "create" a combined staff to insure the promulgation of strategic aims in the theater. [Tripp, 15]

Issues concerning Allied command structure are often important at levels below that of the Supreme Theater Commander. The key issue is the degree to which allied troop units (as opposed to high level staffs) should be integrated. "Another manifestation of the impossibility of achieving unqualified subordination of national forces to an Allied commander was the generally prevailing prohibition against distributing the organizational integrity of troop formations....The principle was supported, too, by practical obstacles to administrative intermingling of troops organized under different systems. Allied field commands in the European-Mediterranean area were usually large, in order that their national components might be separately administered and supported by separate supply lines. By a standing agreement preceding the Normandy invasion, units smaller than a corps in the Anglo-American forces were not to be placed under a commander of another nationality except in an emergency. In Burma and the Pacific where operations were on a smaller scale, unity of command sometimes reached father down into the organizational structure." [Leighton, 421-422]

"Troops fight better under Commanders of their own nationality, unless they can, from long association, be inspired to have complete confidence in a foreign commander." [Smith, 457] In World War I General Pershing fought long and hard to preserve the integrity of the American Expeditionary Forces, noting: "As our troops were being trained for open warfare, there was every reason why we could not allow them to be scattered among our Allies, even by divisions, much less as replacements, except by pressure of sheer necessity. Any sort of permanent amalgamation would irrevocably commit America's fortunes to the hands of the Allies." [United States Army, A.E.F., Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, 19]

In his post-World War II memoir General Omar Bradley noted his resistance to the amalgamation of US troops with Montgomery's 21 Army Group [i.e. - "permanent" assignment of US divisions to Monty]. It did occur temporarily at the time of the Battle of the Bulge but everyone noted specifically that it was a temporary arrangement. [Bradley, 327-328 and 476-478]

The British in World War I, and to a certain degree in World War II, were not reluctant to have American troops amalgamated into their formations. In February 1944 Field Marshal Alexander, the Allied

commander in Italy, complained to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of the poor leadership of the US VI Corps and suggested that the US VI Corps headquarters be relieved by a British corps headquarters. On 16 February 1944 General Eisenhower reported his reply to this important suggestion in an "Eyes Only" message for General George C. Marshall, the US Army Chief of Staff, stating: "A. All American matters in Italy are exclusive business of General Devers and Clark. The problem is their responsibility working with Generals Wilson and Alexander. B. That it is absolutely impossible in an Allied force to shift command of any unit from one nationality to another during a period of crisis. This should be accomplished, if considered necessary, during periods of inactivity but not while the going is tough. Any such action when things are not too bright would be interpreted as an attempt to 'pass the buck' and would create repercussions that would be felt throughout the Allied forces everywhere." [Eisenhower to Marshall, Msg No. W-11279, 16 February 1944 - "Eyes Only", Carlisle Barracks, PA, USAMHI Archives, OCMH Collection, Box: Mediterranean - S. Mathews, Folder: Eisenhower Messages]

Although it was generally agreed that divisions should be employed intact, experience in Europe in World War II demonstrated that: "Combat support units (tank destroyer battalions, field artillery battalions/groups/brigades, separate tank battalions, etc.) can more readily and effectively be attached to allied formations than units organic to divisions." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 5] General Eisenhower himself noted in his final report that: "In the matter of command, it can be said here that all relationships between American and British forces were smooth and effective. Because of certain fundamental national differences in methods of military supply and administration, it was early agreed that no unit lower than a corps of one nationality would be placed under command of the other nationality except where unavoidable military necessity made this imperative." [SHAEP, Eisenhower's Own Story of the War, 7]

THE COMBINED STAFF

One of the major tasks of a combined commander is to organize an effective, usually integrated, staff and to insure its effective functioning. General Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's wartime Chief of Staff, has noted that there are "...two conditions which are prerequisite to successful functioning of an Integrated Headquarters in a integrated armed force:

(1) A single commander with control of all the resources the participating nations have put in one theater, the confidence of the various national leaders, and rather a broad charter of command.

(2) The absence of a language barrier [including a common technical language]." [Smith, 455]

According to Smith the actual organization of the staff is not particularly important; SHAEF used the American system. [Smith, 456] In brief, "the staff of the supreme commander must, if all nations are to participate, be a combined group assembled from the several contributing nations. The individuals who compromise this staff must be loyal to the supreme commander and must devote their efforts toward prospering the combined team as a whole....Cooperation, respect, and team play is essential for members of this staff." [Crawford, 55]

As is the case with the combined commander himself, the members of his staff should possess certain special characteristics beyond mere technical military competence. "...[T]he most important aspects of combined staff leadership [are]---empathy, professionalism, nationalism, and cohesiveness." [Thomas, 36] "...[I]n the selection of individuals for members of coalition staffs rigidity of thinking, ultra-national tendencies, narrowness of vision, and truculent personalities are to be avoided. Rather, the individual to be sought is one with adaptability, broadness of vision, flexibility of thinking, and a broad knowledge of peoples." [Chapman, 26-27] And beyond the normal problems faced by any military staff the members of an integrated combined staff must be alert for special problems. Cooling and Hixson note that a "...checklist for HQ staffs in combined operations should include:

(1) Counterintelligence problems are increased in an allied force;

(2) Variations in organization, tactical doctrine, and differences of equipment will likely lead not only to operational, but also to administrative and logical problems;

(3) If an allied unit is weak in certain combat, combat support, or combat services support capabilities, then it is necessary to supply that deficiency from the resources of an ally, and the units so transferred should then come under the command of that allied unit;

(4) The formation of "ad hoc" forces, i.e. ~ forces formed from pieces of various units and from two or more allied forces, should be limited to case of transcendent necessity...." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 7-8]

Cooling and Hixson also observe that "there can be no substitute for a staff officer possessing a firm grasp of allied organization, operational doctrine, and philosophy of war" and that in the future "...frequent personal liaison and information-gathering visits by staff officers at every level will be even more essential to understanding allied intentions, capabilities, and feelings." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 6] In their work they also constantly point out the importance of properly prepared liaison officers as key members of the combined commanders staff.

Although military staffs and staff procedures were fully developed in World War I, there was little experience with combined staff operations. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Foch, has a staff smaller than that of a brigade (General Weygand as Chief of Staff and 2-3 personal aides) and thus could only issue directives in the form of broad outline plans for coming operations and memoranda containing his views on important matters. [Bauer, 17]

The large, integrated combined staff was a product of World War II. Although its optimum development was probably in North Africa and Europe under General Eisenhower, the integrated staff was found to some degree in all theaters. The sole exception may have been in the China Theater where as Allied Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, General Stilwell had no supporting staff at all, one not being permitted by the Chinese. [Romanus and Sunderland, 3]

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in North Africa in 1942 was the first military headquarters ever organized that combined and integrated personnel of two different nationalities. [Bauer, 16] AFHQ served as a laboratory for testing principles and procedures of the command and training of US and British staffs in combined operations. [Pogue, 56] And it was "as allied commander in chief in the Mediterranean theater, [that] General Eisenhower learned the metier of Supreme Command and became familiar with most of the problems he later faced at SHAEF." [Pogue, 57] AFHQ provided the model for subsequent MTO/ETO combined headquarters and its organizational pattern embraced three principles:

1. Unity of Command;
2. Balanced Personnel;
3. The "Principle of the Opposite Number" (i.e. - deputy from another country) [Hixson, Eisenhower, 8-9]

"Organized on the principle of balanced national participation, AFHQ deviated from that principle only in cases where specialized knowledge of organization, technique, and procedure was the over-riding consideration." [Thomas, 35]

With General Mark Clark as DCINC, Allied Force, the AFHQ staff gathered at Norfolk House on St. James' Square, London, in early August 1942 to plan the invasion of North Africa. [Franks, 8] MG Bedell Smith arrived to take over as Chief of Staff on 7 September 1942. "The design and creation of the AFHQ staff is one of the major accomplishments of Generals Eisenhower, Clark and Smith....To insure Allied unity of effort, the entire staff organization was new and was designed after a close theoretical study of the problems likely to be encountered by a combined staff." [Franks, 9]

AFHQ staff was quite large and was formed on the American pattern except for the creation of the Chief Administrative Officer (British MG H. M. Gale) to supervise personnel and logistical functions.

[Franks, 9-10] Integration was complete in operations, operations planning, intelligence, and supply planning portions of the AFHQ staff [Franks, 12], but AFHQ maintained two complete personnel and logistical systems which were not integrated but coordinated [Franks, 10] The staff was "balanced" with nearly equal number of British and American staff officers and no duplication of functions. British officers held the G-1, G-2, and G-4 positions and US officers held the Chief of Staff and G-3 positions while each country maintained its own special staff sections. The special staff sections had coordinated British and American sub-sections (coordinated by their chief) for those areas requiring special (national) knowledge, but other sections were integrated. [Franks, 13] AFHQ used staff procedures which were a compromise between the British (conference-decision) and US (guidance-individual consultation-decision) methods. [Franks, 14-15]

"Within the crowded makeshift offices of AFHQ, British and American staffs had achieved a homogeneity that was already a tribute to Ike's insistence on Allied cooperation.... Ike was explicit in his orders. Troublemakers who waved the flag were to be sent straight back home--home on a slow boat, unescorted....In forming an Allied headquarters Eisenhower had organized joint staffs in intelligence, operations, and supply planning. Where a section was headed by a Briton, his deputy was an American. And where an American bossed the operation, a Briton filled in as his Number Two man. But in the supply and administrative organizations it became necessary to establish parallel British and American staffs because of the disparities that existed in equipment and procedures of both armies." [Bradley, 33] General Bradley also noted that the British were far superior to Americans as intelligence officers because of greater concentration on the task in the British Army by capable men; in the US Army intelligence was a dumping ground and staff duties were neglected as compared to command. [Bradley, 33] In general, most observers credit the British with being much better prepared as staff officers. General Wedemeyer lamented the apparent superior preparation of British staff officers early in the war which more often than not permitted the British to have their way in the debates over Allied strategy. [Tripp, 14]

AFHQ was the model for SHAEF, General Eisenhower noting: "I patterned my Headquarters upon the closely integrated Allied establishment which it had been my policy to maintain at AFHQ in the Mediterranean...." [SHAEF, Eisenhower's Own Story of the War, 3] General Eisenhower retained personal command of ground forces, but utilized an Allied commander for both air and naval forces. Staffs of the Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief were organized parallel to that of Supreme Commander and SHAEF intelligence and operations sections were joint as well as combined. [Smith, 456] As was the case with AFHQ. "the guiding principle in building up the SHAEF combined staff was generally that equal British and American representation would be effected both as to position and numbers." [Paulick, 52-53]

Eisenhower's G-3, General Bull, noted that: "National viewpoints were always welcomed but determinations of actions and recommendations were made invariably on the basis of firm operational needs to best meet the requirements of the over-all battle situation....SHAEF planning...resulted in broad over-all operational directives appropriate to guiding and coordinating the over-all operations of the Allied Army Groups, the Allied Airborne Army and the Allied Naval and Air Forces. The directives were relatively brief and designed to set forth the mission and the objective desired by the Supreme Commander, the time element involved, the main effort, the area of responsibility, including boundaries, the allocation of forces and other means." [Bull, 4-5] "An unusual feature about the SHAEF staff was the inclusion of political officers and the attendant political and governmental problems anticipated in the liberation of Nazi-dominated Europe." [Ash, 34]

General Bull also observed that although integration became the general rule throughout SHAEF, there was a significant exception....the Operations Section of the G-4 Division consisted of two parallel organizations, representing the two national British and US Logistics systems. This was because, although operational control of mixed nationalities is feasible provided the organization and equipment of their respective armies are generally equivalent, logistic support cannot be integrated unless the organization and equipment of those armies are identical." [Bull, 3-4]

British Lieutenant General Sir Humfrey Gale, the Chief Administrative Officer of SHAEF has also stated that the office of Chief Administrative Officer was necessary in SHEAF, just as it was in AFHQ, to coordinate the major administrative requirements of the two armies and to interpret to the various agencies what they were to do. He noted that the task in AFHQ was different from that in SHAEF---"In North Africa we actually achieved integration; SHAEF was a bigger affair; the organization was more loosely knit. Sir Humfrey also expressed the opinion that there were defects in SHAEF organization which were only overcome by the personality of Eisenhower. [Interview by Forrest Pogue with LTG Sir Humfrey Gale (CAO, SHAEF), London, 27 January 1947, Carlisle Barracks, PA, USAMHI Archives, OCMH Collection, Box: Supreme Command, Folder: Interviews by Forrest Pogue, 1946-1947]

In World War II no significant attempt was made to integrate staffs at the tactical level, but Army and Army Group headquarters were commonly integrated to some extent. Headquarters, 15th Army Group (US Fifth Army and British Eighth Army) in Italy did have a partially integrated staff which was reorganized on American staff lines after General Mark Clark assumed command in December 1944. 1st Allied Airborne Army also had a combined British-American headquarters, and Continental Advanced Section (established in 1944 to support Allied forces in Southern France) was an integrated logistical headquarters composed of American and French personnel. [Bauer, 25]

UNITY OF COMMAND

Perhaps the single most critical issue facing the theater commander in combined operations is the issue of "unity of command" -- the idea that "a single commander would command all forces within any given theater." [Hixson, Eisenhower, 5] "For any military commander the final and decisive measure of his authority is control over troops. The limitations upon an Allied commander's autonomy were nowhere more evident than in the formal restrictions upon his freedom to control the national forces under his command. [Leighton, 417]

The issue of unity of command was first raised in World War I. Unified and coordinated effort was achieved in World War I only when the Allies stood at the brink of disaster after the beginning of the great German offensive in March 1918. "Until that time effective coordination did not exist because of national prejudices, jealousies, distrust, and divergent political objectives." [Bauer, 2] Under pressure of the March 1918 German offensive the French Marshal Foch was appointed under the terms of the Doullens agreement of 26 March 1918 to coordinate the actions of all the Allied armies. [Agnew, 60] On 14 May 1918 Foch was designated as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France for the purpose of "strategic direction of military operations" under the provisions of the Beauvais agreement of 3 April 1918. "Foch...considered that his principal problems...stemmed from each commander's concern for the preservation of his own forces and the consistent refusal to subordinate national interests to Allied requirements. Not until the Beauvais Agreement in April 1918 did Foch gain any semblance of effective control of Allied forces....While his powers included strategic direction, national commanders retained full control of tactical employment plus the right of appeal to their own governments if they deemed Foch's directions to jeopardize the safety of their forces. Indeed, this was command by compromise." [Ash, 33] So it was that "...the Allies did not realize great success in France until they adopted a framework of unanimity and centralization of operations." [Agnew, 63]

The concept of "unified command" and the role of Supreme Commander was developed with care and precision in World War II and the powers required by the Allied Supreme Commander were much wider than those of Foch in World War I. "...[T]he concept of unified command was still largely theoretical in December 1941. Even the theory dealt only with unified command for a "task force," a force organized to carry out a specific objective, not with the formation of a permanent command organization for a continental area." [Chandler] However, the basic pattern was set by the summer of 1942 by the preparations for the North African invasion and the key role was played by General Eisenhower. [Bauer, 3]

"Invariably the powers of the joint [i.e. - combined] commander have been closely hedged about by restrictions designed to preserve the direct chain of command from the central authority of the service or

national to its own commanders in the field." [Leighton, 402] "The first real charter of unified command was drawn up in the gloomy atmosphere of the Anglo-American military conference which met in Washington immediately after Pearl Harbor. The conference had the task, among others, of organizing the command of Allied forces opposing the Japanese advance into the Netherlands, East Indies, and Malaya....The LOI for General Sir Archibald Wavell as Supreme Commander, ABDACOM, was, on the insistence of General George C. Marshall, severely restricted....Its provisions forbade the commander to relieve any subordinate officer; to alter the "major tactical organization" of national forces or to disperse them among multinational task forces; to take over "for general use" supplies, munitions, or other resources without the consent of the owning government; to interfere in the administration or disciplinary measures of a national commander over his own forces; to interfere with direct communication between a commander and his home government; to prevent a commander from obeying his own government in detaching troops or material to another theater; or to assume direct command of any part of the forces assigned to him. He could not transfer land forces from their own national territory without permission from their government; his only mobile forces, in fact, were naval elements and bombardment aviation, and each government could employ its tactical aircraft at its own discretion. All his major commanders were to be named by their own governments." [Leighton, 403-404]

"The directive finally sent to General Wavell actually omitted several of the explicit prohibitions of the original, and all its invidious "you may not's"...While the supreme commander was to have no jurisdiction over internal administration of national forces, he was nevertheless authorized "to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials." [Leighton, 405] Fortunately, "most of the laborious spelling-out of rights of appeal and scope of authority was later omitted in directives to Allied theater commanders, as it became clear the restrictions were implicit in the sovereignty of the contracting powers." [Leighton, 406]

In World War II "complete unity of command--over "air, ground and ships"--was not achieved in any theater....These arrangements, and similar ones in other theaters, placed under the Allied theater commander, not all forces within the defined region of the theater, but only such specific forces as the High Command considered necessary, by a more or less narrow interpretation of the need, for the accomplishing of his mission....An Allied commander's control over the forces in the theater was determined in part by the extent to which the basic organization of these forces cut across national lines." [Leighton, 417]

"Whatever his position, a national commander in a theater was expected by his superiors at home to be watching for national interests. His most formidable instrument for doing so was the right

of appeal." [Leighton, 420] For example, one restriction of Wavell's authority as Supreme Commander, ABDACOM, was the right of an immediate subordinate to appeal directly to his own government before carrying out orders he believed would jeopardize the national interests of his country. [Bauer, 4] "This right of appeal was the symbol and the crux of the problem of command in a coalition. It was to haunt all later effort to make the system work." [Leighton, 406] As General Eisenhower himself observed: "...every commander in the field possesses direct disciplinary power over all subordinates of his own nationality and of his own service...But such authority and power cannot be given by any country to an individual of another nation." [Bauer, 4; see also Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, pages 29-30] Nevertheless, in North Africa General Eisenhower sought and obtained changes in the LOI from the British War Office of his British ground forces commander, General Anderson, which restricted Anderson's "right of appeal." [Franks, 24]

"The corollary of the right of appeal...was the Allied theater commander's lack of effective power to relieve or to discipline commanders of another nationality." [Leighton, 421] This was tacitly agreed in all theaters throughout the war. Fortunately it did not prove necessary "to test the effectiveness of command organization solely by the authority of the commander to coerce recalcitrant subordinates. The authority inherent in command is a kind of reserve power, rarely asserted. This reserve power Allied commanders lacked....For the power to coerce, Allied commanders everywhere had to substitute the power to persuade." [Leighton, 425] In any event "...unity of action was not wholly dependent upon unity of command. Eisenhower quite obviously recognized this. His whole effort was directed, not to gaining coercive authority over unwilling subordinates, but to creating a spirit of willing and enthusiastic cooperation." [Leighton, 422]

The existence of alternate routes of communications to national authorities by-passing the Supreme Commander were a sometimes troublesome factor in all the World War II Allied theaters. "Only in the European theater did the senior officer report directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff." [Chandler] Elsewhere, the situation was far more complex. In China, "...Chiang designated Chennault as chief of staff of the Chinese Air Force. By this device, Chennault, even though he was Stilwell's subordinate, now had direct access to two heads of government." [Canella, 64] "The system of national spheres of responsibility was a rationalization of one of the most fundamental anomalies in the coalition system, the existence of two channels of responsibility reaching upward from the Allied theater commander....So, also, was the commander of national forces immediately subordinate to an Allied commander of another nationality---thus creating a third channel by-passing the Allied commander altogether....Allied commanders were thus subject to the historic malady of coalitions, a split-command personality aggravated by frustration arising from the limitations upon their authority to control their subordinates." [Leighton, 411]

"It is doubtful if the complex authority contained in true command will ever be vested in a commander in chief appointed from one nation over troops provided by another nation. Certainly there is no historical basis for such an assumption. The authority of such an international commander is more properly defined as unified command or operational control." [Paulick, 52] Most authorities do agree, however, that "the prerogatives of commanders, where units may be involved in integrated operations, should be firmly established early by common agreement." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 6]

"The history of World War II provides some examples of combined command structures that did succeed. In particular, the European Theater of Operations (ETO) presents an excellent over-all picture of a solution to the problem and it can well serve as a basis for study and development." [Paulick, 52] General Eisenhower's "...establishment of 'real' unity of command, in which the allied CINC exercised executive authority and administrative responsibility in fact, as well as in name, may have been his greatest achievement." [Hixson, Eisenhower, 26]

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMBINED COMMANDER

The higher level commander in a combined theater of operations of course exercises most of the duties and responsibilities of any commander but the emphasis is often different and there are some restrictions on the exercise of command in dealing with allies. "The Theater Army commander is largely a supervisor, a planner and a coordinator who decentralizes combat and administrative operations to the maximum degree to his commanders of Army Groups, Field Armies, Army reserve forces, communications zone, and Army replacement command." [Holderness, 3]

"Perhaps the most important contribution of the higher commander is in establishing early the concept of operation, making prompt, sound and clear-cut decisions and providing essential guidance to enable his staff and commanders to move forward without wasted motion or uncertainty in the preparation of plans and orders, in the assembly, training and disposition of troops and in the host of essential administrative and logistical preparations." - he cannot delegate these." [Holderness, 11] "The Allied commander's true function, like that of any commander, was not coercion but decision, the final responsibility of choosing among various possible courses of action. This normal function Allied commanders exercised, every day and every hour." [Leighton, 425] In the case of General Eisenhower "...the final decisions on a broad strategy within his theater were his. From North Africa to the Elbe, Eisenhower--not his staff or his commanders--defined the basic strategy for the approval of the CCS and made the key decisions required to carry it out." [Chandler]

Perhaps the best example to look to for information on the duties and responsibilities of the allied theater commander is that of General Eisenhower in Europe in World War II. In June 1942 Eisenhower was assigned to command the United States European Theater of Operations and shortly thereafter he was named as CINC, Allied Expeditionary Forces, for the invasion of North Africa. Of course, he subsequently became the Supreme Allied Commander for the invasion of Europe itself. Eisenhower had no historical precedent upon which to draw in the exercise of responsibility as an allied commander. [Jessup, 11] In general he faced five main problems:

- "1. Unity of Command;
2. Organizing the allied command;
3. Conflicting political, economic, and military policies and objectives of each of the allied powers;
4. Operational problems created by the employment of several dissimilar military systems;
5. The personalities of the Government leaders and commanders of each of the armed services of the allied powers under command, their capabilities, personal and professional habits, and their ambitions." [Hixson, Eisenhower, 2]

"Eisenhower concentrated his personal attention on two basic concerns. One was the creation of a command organization or structure. The other was the planning and carrying out of broad strategies to defeat the Axis forces in Europe." [Chandler] After his first weeks in Great Britain, Eisenhower as commander, AFHQ, "...turned his full attention to the problem of organization. This involved three separate matters: first, he had to make certain that the lines of authority and communication assured him of complete control of all three services of the two nations; second, he had to build his own completely integrated staff; and third, he had to select the subordinate American commanders." [Chandler]

One of the most critical tasks for the commander is the selection of his staff and subordinate commanders. "Obviously, no command organization could be better than the officers who manned it, and Eisenhower paid close attention to the selection of his staff and of his subordinate commanders. Until the summer of 1944 he personally reviewed and made recommendations for promotions to general officer rank of all American officers in his theater." [Chandler] Although he had a relatively free hand with regard to the selection, relief, reward, and discipline of American subordinates, Eisenhower, like other allied commanders, was somewhat restricted in the management of Allied personnel. The combined theater commander can prescribe broad policies but the details of personnel administration remains a "national"

responsibility. [Devers, 9] The combined theater commander can exercise no authority over the personnel practices (number and quality of troops, designation of commanders, etc.) of allied forces under his command "...except such as he is able to exercise through his own personality and through "gentlemen's agreements" with his senior subordinate commanders." [Devers, 8]

Even the day-to-day direction of subordinates of the Allied nations was sometimes a problem for Eisenhower and other senior combined commanders. "Public sensitivity to high command positions for their national heroes, ...became a problem Eisenhower had to face again in Germany as operations on the continent developed." [Jessup, 12] In Italy US Fifth Army Commander, General Mark Clark encountered the problem of "kid-glove treatment" for Allied subordinates in one of the most controversial decisions of the war, the bombing of the Abbey of Montecassino. General Clark opposed the bombing which was demanded by General Freyberg, the New Zealand corps commander and approved by General Alexander, the British 15th Army Group commander. Clark made clear to Alexander that if Freyberg were "an American commander, he [Clark] would give specific orders that it should not be bombed." [Clark, 317] However, even the British were loathe to disregard the wishes of semi-independent Commonwealth commanders and the venerable abbey was destroyed.

"Thrust between Churchill and the American Chiefs on the one hand, and De Gaulle and Roosevelt on the other, Eisenhower was forced to become a master diplomat....In addition to dealing regularly with the heads of two leading European powers, Eisenhower and his staff also worked closely with those of the smaller governments....As the senior American military officer he was also the first to negotiate with the enemy. He had to work out the arrangements to end hostilities, first with the Vichy French in North Africa and later in the complex and tortuous negotiations that led to the Italian surrender. Finally, he had to handle the German capitulation." [Chandler] Although deeply involved in political decisions, General Eisenhower strongly recommended "...that whenever possible, the military commander must be relieved of his responsibility for making decisions which are political in nature, and which may affect the international relationships of allied nations." [Peckham, 47]

When Eisenhower became involved in controversial political issues, "...his method was first to determine what he considered the most satisfactory position concerning the strategic objectives for his current campaign. He would then define his position on these matters in terms of the most satisfactory military solution." [Chandler] The French constantly provided the greatest challenge to Eisenhower's skills as a diplomat, particularly in the early days in North Africa. "Integration at the front in North Africa was foiled by the French who refused to serve under British commanders; consequently Eisenhower was obliged to set up a forward command post of his own where he spent much

of his time directly coordinating operations of the British, French and American forces on the line." [Bauer, 19] "In his dealing with the French--from his first campaign until the last--Eisenhower also defined his position in terms of current military needs." [Chandler]

In addition to his many complex and difficult duties as an Allied supreme commander General Eisenhower's other duties included seeing to the welfare and morale of American officers and men as well as their training and discipline. [Chandler] One important aspect of his duties, frequently ignored by commentators, was dealing with the press. In regard to press relationships General Eisenhower said: "I know of nothing which I would be more careful to get organized with a very splendid man at its head. And I would keep that type of organization running all down through the command, and I would make sure early in the game that every commander understood its tremendous importance." [Chapman, 14] Press relationships in World War II included censorship, an activity with its own peculiarities in a combined command. "Censorship, of multi-national command, is exercised to assure three things; first to prevent breaches of security; second to prevent the disturbance of allied relations; and third to publicize the exploits of forces equitably." [Chapman, 15]

Perhaps even more that in unilateral operations, the combined commander must maintain frequent, direct, and personal contact with his subordinates to insure their understanding of directives and policies and to cultivate their willing cooperation in the common effort. "Personal intervention and exercise of direct, personal influence to assure coordination and success in the initial phases of the mission assigned by the next higher combined authority" is listed by General Devers as one of the key problems for the theater commander in combined operations. [Devers, 12] "The importance of the personal assumption by the Theater Commander of his vital responsibilities in operations of this character cannot be overly emphasized." [Devers, 13-14] Cooling and Hixson also observe: "Only personal visits by commanders and their staffs will generally provide an adequate picture of his allies' capabilities, needs, assets. Constant assessment of such a personal nature will be absolutely necessary." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 5] After the war General Eisenhower noted that as a matter of technique, "It was always my habit to go down to my commanders rather than to bring them up to me. I thought that this was the best way to establish good relations within an Allied force. [Interview by Colonel S. L. A. Marshall with General Eisenhower, Detroit, 3 June 1946, Carlisle Barracks, PA, USAMHI Archives, OCMH Collection, Box: "Supreme Command", Folder: "Interview by Forrest Pogue, 1946-1947"]

In the final analysis the major task for the theater commander in combined operations is to link together effectively the varied Allied forces at his command and to insure their cooperation. "The supreme commander must prevent friction between his forces while engendering the mutual confidence, respect, and the will to cooperate that are

essential to the success of an allied effort." [Crawford, 55] In particular he must strive for "...the utmost in mutual respect and confidence among the group of seniors making up the allied command." [Chandler]

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMBINED COMMANDER

Many commentators have sought to list the personal characteristics that a combined commander at higher levels ought to possess. General Devers notes that "...a Theater Commander charged with conducting combined operations must be possessed of unquestioned ingenuity, professional skill, tact, good judgement, and patience." [Devers, 3] Another writer opines that the attributes expected of a higher level commander include: competence, courage, judgement, decision, determination, confidence, leadership, loyalty, and understanding. "He must be a strong man of character who inspires other strong men of character." [Holderness, 10] Chapman observes that "As well as excellence of military skill, the Commander of Multi-national forces in war, to be successful, must have the political acumen of a Churchill, the diplomacy of a Franklin, the patience of Job and the wisdom of Solomon." [Chapman, 1] He goes on to state that "...the qualities required of a supreme commander are more those of character than of military skill. He should have a marked rather than an overwhelming personality and should be tactful but firm, essentially a thinker and a planner in order to make well deliberated decisions. He should be able to express his views clearly and convincingly and be adaptable, entirely free of jealousy and beyond ambition. And above all he should possess the type of leadership which brings forth willing cooperation from subordinates." [Chapman, 12-13]

Ash notes that "...there is no readily recognizably sharp dividing line between the political issues and the sphere of the military. The successful military proponent of a coalition strategy must be well-grounded in his knowledge of his allies; he must possess a desire to understand them." [Ash, 36-37] And Blumenson adds that "...coalition warfare imposes certain restrictions upon commanders. In a sense, allied warfare compels commanders to act in accordance with a set of manners somewhat different from what is usually expected on the battlefield. In addition to the normal attributes of a commander, a coalition commander needs understanding, tact, and sensitivity of a special sort." [Blumenson, "Coalition Command," 54]

General Dwight D. Eisenhower was certainly the most successful combined commander of World War II, and perhaps of all time. Eisenhower himself has observed that: "When you get into command in war...you can no longer think merely in terms of strictly professional [military] factors....you cannot think merely of problems affecting war...solely in terms of military equipment and military organization. Your thinking has to be pitched on a much wider plane." [Eisenhower, Command in War, 2-3]

Others have commented on Eisenhower's skill and characteristics as an allied supreme commander. "General Eisenhower, of course, had a tremendously difficult job in coordinating the Allied commands and keeping them working as a team. It often seemed to me that he leaned over backward to avoid showing any partiality toward the Americans in his desire to be objective and promote harmony. But Allied success, he knew, depended on eliminating friction between the different parts of the team. He, too, wanted to get US formations under one command [in North Africa], but was willing to defer this action in order to capture Tunis before the bad weather set in. He was willing to gamble on the piecemeal employment of American troops under British command, if, in that way, time would be saved and all of Tunis could be occupied." [Clark, 134] "The reputation of the Supreme Commander established in the North African and Mediterranean Theater, was one profoundly and sincerely interested in the welfare of all elements of his command, be they British, French or American and as one whose sole impartial motive was to make his decisions on the merits of how best to win the battle of campaign in the war, laid the groundwork for smooth operation of the combined command which he organized and directed in Europe." [Bull, 2] Finally, Frank states: "Throughout the entire planning period, and later during the actual operation, the single most important factor in making the Allied command work was General Eisenhower's attitude, which can best be summed up in his own words: 'I was determined from the first to do all in my power to make this a truly Allied force, with real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility. Alliances in the past have done no more than to name a common foe and "unity of command" has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national prejudices, ambitions and recriminations of high ranking officers, unwilling to subordinate themselves or their forces to a commander of different nationality or different service.' (AFHQ, "Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch," page 1)." [Franks, 27]

THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY

War is the most characteristically human of activities and coalition warfare brings together a variety of human types, each with his or her own unique personality, motive, habits, level of skill, goals and ambitions. Nearly every commentator on coalition warfare singles out personality as a factor to be reckoned with in any combined operation. General Eisenhower noted that: "War is far more of the heart than it is of the head. War is not a science...in which you make certain calculations, put the answer on the board and gain victory as all the factors in that equation become satisfied. War is a drama; it is moving every day." [Eisenhower, *Command in War*, 9] He also noted that "personality in war becomes almost more important than anything else." [Eisenhower, *Command in War*, 4] General Devers also noted that the most important problem faced by the theater commander in combined operations is: "The personalities of senior commanders of each of the armed services of the allied powers under command, their capabilities, personal and professional habits, and their ambitions." [Devers, 14]

And Cooling and Hixson note that: "The personality of commanders and staff officers is, together with planning for interoperability, the most important factor in the establishment of effective combined operations....A spirit of mutual respect and cooperation must be instilled and maintained throughout the command. A parochial or nationalistic attitude on the part of a commander will soon be mirrored by his staff and subordinates." [Cooling and Hixson, Lessons, 3]

Thus, the task of the commander in combined operations is to minimize the effect of the varied personalities of the individuals involved of whatever nationality and to insure their harmonious cooperation toward achievement of the agreed upon allied goal. According to General Devers "...the first task of a Theater Commander in combined operations must be to establish complete harmony with and between the various personalities of the senior commanders of the services of the various nations under command." [Devers, 14] "...[H]is first concern...is the complete analysis and understanding of the characteristics, capabilities, personalities, ambitions, and personal and professional habits of his various senior commanders." [Devers, 14] Devers also points out that: "The Theater Commander will frequently be compelled to accept less desirable solutions to tactical and logistical problems in order to secure that complete harmony which is so essential among commanders in the successful pursuit of a campaign." [Devers, 14]

Although the commander may be limited in his ability to dispose of subordinate allied commanders lacking the requisite sense of cooperation and compromise, he is often in a position to relieve subordinates of his own nation and often can arrange the reassignment of members of his own staff of whatever nationality. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff "Beetle" Smith noted that "...there is one thing which is extremely important. An integrated staff gets along only by the exercise of considerable tact and a great deal of goodwill, and misfits must be eliminated ruthlessly." [Smith, 456] General Eisenhower's AFHQ and SHAEF staffs were well aware of the consequences of failure to mute personalities and avoid conflict on the basis of nationality. The well-known anecdote was that Eisenhower would tolerate an American staff officer calling his cantankerous British counterpart "a son-of-a-bitch", but calling him a "British son-of-a-bitch" would earn an ignominious trip home to the States in a slow boat. [Bauer, 13] In both World Wars liaison officers often played a key role in minimizing the effects of personality on the conduct of allied operations. One of the key American liaison officers of World War I, Lloyd C. Griscom, observed that: "One of the very important duties of a liaison officer in addition to keeping up communications, is to try to prevent two great military commanders, or two great Prime Ministers, from taking a violent dislike to each other." [Griscom, 1]

In advising Lord Louis Mountbatten on his takeover as Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater, "Eisenhower stressed that personal relationships were of more importance in creating a unified allied command than any written orders." [Chandler] And many others

have noted that "[m]utual trust is an absolute prerequisite to allied success." [Ash, 36] Lord Mountbatten needed all the advice he could garner since he took over supreme command of the one World War II theater perhaps best known for the impact of strong personalities, including, successively, General Joseph Stilwell and General Albert C. Wedemeyer as the senior US representative.

A prickly personality (or, even worse, two prickly personalities) may greatly complicate the achievement of allied unity. Indeed, the two antagonists need not be of different nations. "One of the most controversial [World War II] relationships was that between China Theater Commander "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell and General Claire Chennault." [Canella, 63] As a result, World War II command relationships in the China Theater were probably more complex and less effective than in any other theater and less was achieved in the long run. Eventually Stilwell was replaced by Albert C. Wedemeyer. "His [Wedemeyer's] mission in Asia and on Mountbatten's staff was to ameliorate the hard feelings created mostly by Stilwell's personality." [Tripp, 14-5] Wedemeyer achieved some degree of success and his previous experience in China [with the 15th Infantry] may have helped him understand the Chinese better.

Often, the normal problems caused by the conflict of strong personalities may be compounded by narrowly national perspectives. British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery was well-known as one of the most "difficult", if effective, field commanders in Europe in World War II. As Supreme Allied Commander General Eisenhower had his own problems with Montgomery as a subordinate, and when General Bradley's US 12th Army Group was pulled out from Montgomery's British 21 Army Group and made coequal the British press took it as a slight on Montgomery and there was a fracas. [Bradley, 352-355] Later, in January 1945 Bradley threatened to ask for relief from command if 12th Army Group were [again] subordinated to Montgomery's 21 Army Group and General George Patton also indicated to Bradley that he too would "quit", but Prime Minister Winston Churchill smoothed over the matter. [Bradley, 487-488] General Bradley later observed that "[h]ad Montgomery commanded his American subordinates in this same rigid manner [direct interference in their conduct of battle], we would have complained bitterly, for we would never have surrendered the traditional independence of actions that is given us within the framework of higher command directives. Monty recognized this distinction and as a result never insisted upon scrutinizing in detail our field operations." [Bradley, 210]

"Upon cooperation and little more, nevertheless, the effective functioning of the coalition in the last analysis depended." [Leighton, 422]

SUMMARY

The study of Operation SHINGLE, the landings at Anzio in 1944, by retired Army Lieutenant Colonel John A. Hixson ["Operation SHINGLE: Combined Planning and Preparation," Military Review, 69, no. 3(March

1989), 63-77] provides perhaps the best single illustration of the many problems facing a theater commander in combined operations. Hixson notes that Operation SHINGLE was one of the most controversial operations of World War II because it had the potential to break the stalemate in Italy and capture Rome but failed to do so, primarily because of inadequacies in concept, planning, and leadership of a combined force. "By December 1943 the experience of North Africa and Sicily had taught that "satisfactory integration of Allied units at corps level and below was difficult to attain and questionable to attempt....nevertheless the decision was made to integrate the British 1st Infantry Division with the US VI Corps despite the reservations of General Eisenhower and Major General John P. Lucas, the commander of US VI Corps and SHINGLE assault force commander....Ostensibly, the risky nature of the operation was the reason for integrating a British infantry division into the US VI Corps. The British believed they should assume an equal share of the risk...[but]...the use of a combined force complicated what was already a complex and risky operation."

"...[T]he command personality in the interoperability equation is of paramount importance...and Lucas was unsuited by experience, habit, temperament, and attitude to the job: he had little experience in working with allies; he seldom visited his subordinate commanders and units (and his staff followed his lead); he rarely provided clear guidance and timely decisions; [and] he neither understood nor trusted the British....This lack of communication and understanding contributed greatly to the bitterness and bickering that developed between the corps headquarters and the British forces within the beachhead area when things began to go wrong at Anzio....[T]he officer charged with combined command must vigorously assert himself to bring about the necessary cohesion quickly. Because his command authority over the other national elements is limited, the combined commander's personality becomes more critical to the success of the endeavor."

General Penney's British 1st Infantry Division had not previously worked with Americans but "...several experienced officers from the British increment, US Fifth Army, were attached to the corps staff. In effect, they constituted a British increment to the US VI Corps and greatly assisted in resolving the many problems inherent in supporting a reinforced division integrated into another national force...A major problem in the sustainment of the combined force was resupply." [especially rations, ammunition, and even POL]....Limited sealift precluded the physical separation of American and British supply items." And, "[l]ike logistics, the national peculiarities of personnel administration precluded standardization and consolidation within the combined force."

For Operation TORCH in November 1942 the unprecedented challenge of combined communications was overcome by creation of a Combined Signal Board to develop new techniques and procedures for the combined operation and the promulgation of four documents titled Combined Communications Board Publications. These were familiar in the MTO by

January 1944. For SHINGLE, "[t]he use of liaison officers, special communications detachments, and the M-209 converter provided the necessary secure communications links between the Allied units....The major exception to the use of liaison officers as the primary communications means was the command channel between Headquarters, US VI Corps, and the British 1st Infantry Division....[T]he lack of a comparative capability (radio teletype for the British) prevented a combined cryptographic system in the combined force." A special communications detachment (1st Special Liaison Detachment, 57th Signal Battalion) was employed to provide the primary communications link between HQ, US VI Corps, and the British 1st Infantry Division with two amphibious trucks with SCR-399 radios and the necessary encryption-decryption devices and materials.

By February 1944, US VI Corps consisted of two British and four American divisions plus supporting forces and had become a field army of over 100,000 personnel. "The Anglo-Americans had tried to apply the integrated field army model to the corps and found that staff liaison and advisors would not suffice, especially with the corps' expanded logistic role."

"The decision to form a combined force for SHINGLE materially affected the conduct of the operation by slowing the rate of build-up in the beachhead area. The requirements to deliver all resupply in proportional amounts and to establish parallel and redundant support systems dictated that available sealift could not be used to maximum efficiency. This action resulted in a slower rate of accumulation of forces and stocks at Anzio."

According to Hixson, four things stand out in Operation SHINGLE:

1. All the units involved had some combat and amphibious operations experience;
2. The operation had been under consideration since September 1943;
3. The American and British planners were assembled in advance in one place where they could live and work together;
4. There was a body of knowledge and experience relating to combined operations and a system in being in the US Fifth Army for providing administrative and logistic support to an integrated allied component.

Hixson thus concludes that these factors enhanced the planning and preparation for SHINGLE and probably averted total disaster.

Naturally each of the authors reviewed in this search of the literature on higher level command in combined operations has provided his own listing of the key conclusions or lessons learned in the course of his research. Some the more pertinent and interesting listings are provided below by way of summary of the entire subject.

Frank Cooling and Jack Hixson have studied the problems of "interoperability" and command in combined operations in some depth and have summarized their findings in a number of studies and articles in addition to the conclusions noted in their original study entitled **Combined Operations in Peace and War** (Revised edition, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Military History Institute, 1982, Figures 39-41 on pages 351-354).

They have also noted in various articles that the historical record suggests several factors that militate against the establishment of effective military cooperation. As laid out in their article entitled "Twentieth Century Allied Interoperability" (Paper B in International Commission on Military History. "Forces Armees et Systemes d'Alliance" - Colloquy, 2-7 September 1981, pages 7-8) these factors include:

1. Time - "The problems of interoperability in the past have usually been solved by trial and error, during actual operations over a period of time--not immediately upon recognition...."

2. Mind Set - "Individuals or units not oriented toward cooperation seldom cooperate readily and effectively. A spirit of cooperation is a must."

3. Differences - "The differences in the several military systems of the allied armies provide the potential for many problems. The greater the dissimilarities, particularly in doctrine and capability, the more extensive the problems."

4. Inexperience - "A unit which is still in the process of working out its own problems can hardly be expected to cooperate effectively with an allied formation."

5. Personality - "Possibly in no other aspect of military operations is the role of personality so important as in interoperability."

6. National Characteristics - "The perceived characteristics of each national component recognized by allies tend to be exaggerated, are almost always derogatory, and therefore constitute a bar to real understanding."

7. Language Differences - "The problem may be great or small depending upon the linguistic composition of the allied force, availability of a common language, and the levels at which integrated units are operating."

8. Objectives - "The objectives of the several allies, while ostensibly common, will in reality seldom be identical. If this non-agreement on objectives is great, it will have a debilitating impact on the operations and morale of the allied force."

Overall, Cooling and Hixson conclude [The Interoperability of Allied Forces in Europe at the Field Army Level, 3-6]:

"1. That the impact of language differences, personal, regional and national animosities, individual and national political views, personalities, organizational, equipment and doctrinal differences and perception of the objective will vary in direct proportion to the number of allies in the coalition.

2. That little in the way of measures to effect functional-level military cooperation was ever developed and/or adopted by any coalition prior to the commencement of hostilities.

3. That practical military cooperation among allied units will be effected in some manner because of basic necessity, regardless as to whether or not higher level agreements have been concluded.

4. That military cooperation in the past has been effected on the ground during the conduct of operations. The pressure of these operations has to a great extent determined the form and effectiveness of the cooperative measures and forms adopted.

5. That prior study of coalition warfare problems and a detailed knowledge of allied capabilities and limitations could have measurably reduced the problems in affecting military cooperation.

6. That the more allied armies resemble each other in organization and equipment the more likely they are to agree on doctrine.

7. That tactical methods will differ even when allied forces are similar in organization, equipment and military thought.

8. That coalition warfare will require an increase in liaison services. How extensive this liaison effort must be depends on many factors.

9. That liaison officers and team members must be carefully chosen based on language proficiency, tact and military knowledge.

10. That commanders will not readily give up control over their logistics and signal communications. Evidence indicates that in these two areas great difficulty has been experienced in affecting cooperation, at least in World War II.

11. That allied cooperation in the initial stages of a coalition effort will be characterized by confusion, misunderstanding, and hard feelings.

12. That although a coalition may intend to conduct operations with each national force having its own separate zone of operations, the demands of prolonged combat, especially defensive combat, will cause the allied force to progressively become more integrated in its composition.

13. That the primary factors contributing to the effectiveness of Anglo-American cooperation at levels in two world wars were: a common language, clearly defined goals, as well as traditional cultural and political heritage.

14. That national political and military sovereignties and policies determine and limit what actions can be taken in peacetime to affect closer military cooperation among allied forces.

15. That little attention has been devoted by western armies to the study of the problems of effecting functional-level military cooperation.

16. That the US Army presently does not nor has it a tradition of instruction in its military educational system dealing with the problems of allied military cooperation, particularly at the functional level.

17. That Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1 July 1976, does outline the factors affecting NATO operations, but does so in a rather cursory manner.

18. That the dominant factor in developing effective military cooperation is available time, i.e. lead-time for resolving problems.

19. That a major catastrophe befalling one of the coalition members, especially a weaker one, may have a radical political and military effect on the entire coalition.

20. That a more detailed study of the defensive battles of 1914 and 1918, BEF and French operations, 1939-1940, German experience in Southern Russia 1941-1944, and the US Fifth Army operations in Italy, 1943-1944, would provide additional information of value."

On the basis of the conclusions reached in their study of combined operations Cooling and Hixson made the following recommendations [The Interoperability of Allied Forces at the Field Army level, pages 6-7]:

"1. That great attention be paid to general and military/technical foreign language training at all levels of command.

2. That a continuing training program be established for commanders and staff officers dealing with the capabilities, limitations and peculiarities of the various NATO forces, and NATO nations, as well as common values and purpose of the alliance.

3. That the logistical capabilities and limitations receive as much attention as tactical capabilities and limitations.

4. That potential liaison officers/parties for deployment with Allied formations be identified early in each allied nation and this information communicated to all partners.

5. That a training program for designated liaison teams be established to acquaint them with their duties, possible and probable problem areas, doctrine and terminology, characteristics and peculiarities of the allied forces to which they will be assigned.

6. That each member of a liaison team (enlisted and commissioned) receive sufficient language training so that the team may continue to function in the event of personnel losses.

7. That a staff manual on military cooperation be developed to assist in planning, conduct of operations and briefing of liaison officers.

8. That all Map and Command Post Exercises feature "allied players" at least in the control groups.

9. That a more extensive exchange program, to include enlisted men, be implemented and not limited to combat arms units only.

10. That packaged lesson plans dealing with the various NATO armies be developed which could be utilized for familiarization at unit level. These lessons should address allied peculiarities which will impact upon a unit at that level.

11. That courses dealing with the problems of affecting cooperative military effort be included in each level of instruction throughout the Army Educational System.

12. That a more detailed study be undertaken of selected historical military campaigns in which the problems of military cooperation predominate."

Other authors offer similar conclusions. Lieutenant Colonel Edwin S. Chapman [Command Problems in a Multi-National Force in War, Student Research Paper, US Army War College, 1955, pages 36-37] states:

"1. Success in coalition warfare will be achieved only to that degree by which mutual understanding and confidence is reached between the political and military leaders of the nations concerned.

2. The adoption of a coalition strategy and the maintenance of high national morale through appropriate press relations and censorship comprise problem areas inherent in coalition warfare.

3. The qualities of commanders and staff officers which will tend to minimize the deleterious effects of problems arising are more those of character than military skill.

4. Command of combined forces will be limited in the extent and degree of authority exercised by the commander.

5. Problems in the organization for combined operations will occur as a result of differences in national characteristics, doctrines and techniques.

6. Proper liaison will provide to the commander a means of alleviating many of the problems arising in combined operations.

7. Differences in language, customs, and pay scales, will constitute major sociological problem areas.

8. All commanders and staff officers, as well as having military skills, must be cognizant of the political, military and sociological forces motivating the troops of those nations within the command.

9. With a thorough knowledge of the factors in the foregoing conclusions, the success of a commander will be determined by the degree to which he exercises sound judgement in the practice of inter-personal relationships."

Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Crawford ["Liaison within an Allied Force," *Military Review*, 29, no. 12(March 1950), pages 48-56] has noted (page 54) that:

"a. The heads of states must agree on the political objectives to be accomplished by the combined effort.

b. The heads of states must agree on procedures for applying the combined military forces provided by the states.

c. A council of government representatives must be appointed to render for the several governments decisions requiring state authority regarding the control of armies.

d. A council of military persons must be formed to exercise, under state supervision, strategic control of the combined military forces.

e. A regional commander in chief of the Allied Powers must be appointed and supported by the heads of state to execute military directives.

f. The allied commander in chief should not exercise administrative or disciplinary control over allied troops.

g. The allied commander in chief should exercise operational control over the operational supply reserves provided by the several nations to support planned operations.

h. Measures must be taken to insure that the several chiefs of state retain their sovereignty.

i. Measures should be taken to insure that the headquarters of the supreme commander of the regional allied force appears in the eyes of the people and the troops of the several nations as a combined agency in which all contributory nations participate.

j. Long-range combined planning by military and state personnel is essential to successful combined military effort."

Addressing the role of the combined commander more directly Colonel Stephen W. Holderness concluded [Responsibilities of High Command in Combat, Student Research Paper, US Army War College, 1955, pages 33-34]:

"1. Of the many attributes of distinguished high commanders, competence, courage (physical and particularly moral), character, intelligence, and human understanding stand out as the most universal and essential.

2. To be eminently successful, the high commander must be a good judge and leader of men. He must provide himself the following essentials for success:

a. A happy, competent staff, working harmoniously as a team, imbued with understanding and loyalty.

b. Major subordinate commanders who are top caliber, experienced, competent leaders of courage, intelligence and character.

3. The high commander makes his greatest contribution by assuring the availability of the means for success, including:

a. Early establishment of a concept and plan of operations that is simple, flexible, offering decisive results leading as quickly and directly as possible to the ultimate objective of destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight;

b. Prompt, sound, clear-cut decisions;

c. Essential guidance;

d. Personnel, material, communications and training;

e. INSPIRATION.

4. The principal measures by which the high commander influences the course of the battle are by weighing and coordinating the effort and by the timely use of his reserve at the point of decision.

5. The responsibilities of the high commander in a nuclear war will remain fundamentally the same:

a. His influence on the course of battle will be tremendously increased with nuclear weapons at his disposal.

b. Logistical considerations and problems will claim even more of his time, effort, and thought.

c. The responsibility for rendering decisions that affect the lives of thousands of men, combatants and non-combatants, will rest even the more heavily on his shoulders.

d. He will find himself confronted even more with the political and economic consequences of his decisions.

6. More so than lower levels of command, the high commander faces delicate and difficult responsibilities of significance in the fields of politics public opinion, civil affairs, and military government.

7. The high commander "Must be as big as his job and not afraid to lose it."

With regard to SHAEF, perhaps the most successful example of an integrated headquarters conducting combined operations in World War II, the General Board, US forces in the European Theater, concluded [Headquarters, US Forces, European Theater. Study No. 2: "Study of the Organization of the European Theater of Operations," Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, HQ, USFET General Board, 1945, page 37] that:

"a. The organization of SHAEF was logical, efficient, integrated to the maximum practical extent and remained unchanged to a remarkable degree.

b. The principle factors determining the organization and methods of operation of the headquarters were the decisions of the Supreme Commander to achieve complete integration and to retain direct control of the United States ground forces.

c. Such changes as were established were made in the interest of increased efficiency, or to meet new problems.

d. It would have been impractical to have attempted the same degree of integration had the other ally been a non-English speaking nation.

e. The appointment of the Supreme Commander at an earlier date would have been beneficial.

f. Trained and experienced staff officers with knowledge of allied staff procedures are essential.

g. Had a British officer been the Supreme Commander initially, the organization of SHAEF would have been generally similar, but staff procedures would probably have followed British practice.

h. Had the French army been in being and ready to participate in the invasion, with the resultant necessity for a large staff representation in the headquarters, it is doubtful if SHAEF could have been as closely integrated."

With respect to the European Theater of Operations, United States Army, the General Board concluded (pages 84-85) that:

"166. Under the existing conditions and had it been practical, the command of ETOUSA exercised through the US SHAEF staff with a separate Theater Headquarters echelon should have resulted in a simpler organization to carry out the Theater Commander's functions, with probable better results in the coordination of the commands in their field operations. Considering the Supreme Commander's desire to retain command of ETOUSA and to have General W. B. Smith to act as his Chief of Staff for both SHAEF and ETOUSA, the separate Theater Headquarters echelon should have been headed by a Deputy Chief of Staff.

167. The placing of overall Theater functions of equal interest to all commands in the Headquarters of one coordinate command, gave rise to organizational difficulties in the Theater. It was difficult for that one Headquarters General Staff to exercise the functions of both Theater and SOS/Com Z and impossible to keep the execution of the two responsibilities separate."

And finally, with respect to the problems of combined logistics Major Arthur E. Conn has cited the following lessons learned from the experience of World War II ["Continental Advance Section: A blueprint for an Integrated Logistical Headquarters," Military Review, 30, no. 3 (June 1950), page 32]:

"1. An integrated HQ whose mission is to provide logistical support for forces composed of the nationals of two countries can be formed.

2. Properly organized and directed, an integrated logistical HQ can function smoothly and harmoniously in the successful prosecution of the war effort.

3. The responsibility delegated to the officers in an integrated logistical headquarters will depend on their ability to accomplish their assigned tasks, regardless of nationality.

4. This integration of personnel of two allies must be extended to include the technical staff sections of the HQ, and not stop at the general staff level.

5. The leaders selected to direct the activities of such an integrated logistical HQ must be imbued with the effectiveness of such HQ, and ...they must be able to motivate their staffs with the feeling that all efforts must be directed toward the accomplishment of the over-all objective, the successful prosecution of the war effort.

6. A mutual understanding of supply procedures and techniques as practiced both by American forces and our Allies must be fostered. This promotes better understanding and more harmonious relationships, which aid in overcoming many of the problems which arise in the day-to-day operations of such a HQ."

In conclusion it is perhaps only fitting that the last word on this subject should be that of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in World War II. Paulick reports that: "General Eisenhower...made the remark that once individuals with the necessary ability were positioned in the organization, it was the unstinting cooperation of the Allies, more than any other factor, which made success possible. The keystone of successful combined warfare is still, and always will be, COOPERATION." [Paulick, 62]

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Headquarters, US Forces, European Theater. **Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Study No. 2: "Study of the Organization of the European Theater of Operations".** [Paris]: HQ, USFET General Board, 1945. A detailed staff study of the organization and command/staff relationships of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces and European Theater of Operations, United States Army (and Service Supply/Communications Zone). Much of this material is to be found in the subsequent literature.

Hixson, John A. **Eisenhower as a Coalition Commander.** Lecture, US Army War College, 1979. This lecture was presented by LTC Hixson to the "Constraints in Command" elective course at the USAWC in 1979 and is derived from the Cooling-Hixson studies on interoperability.

Hixson, John A. "Operation SHINGLE: Combined Planning and Preparation," **Military Review**, 69, no. 3 (March 1989), 63-77. LTC Hixson examines the planning and preparation for Operation SHINGLE, the Allied landing at Anzio in January 1944, with particular attention to the role of unique national requirements and methods (British and American) in the failure of the operations of the combined Anglo-American corps. An excellent summary of the many problems of combined command war.

Holderness, Stephen W. **Responsibilities of High Command in Combat.** Student Research Paper, US Army War College, 15 March 1955. 42 pages. Focussing on the Army Group-Field Army level, Colonel Holderness examines the responsibilities of the higher level commander in wartime and the means and methods by which he influences the course of battle. Although "problems peculiar to allied commands, though important, have been omitted," this study is quite valuable to the development of Combined Army Operations.

International Commission on Military History. **"Forces Armees et Systems d'Alliance" -Colloquy, 2-7 September 1981.** Montpellier, France: International Commission on Military History [Centre d'Histoire Militaire et d'Etude de Defense National, Universite Paul Valery], 1981. A collection of 61 papers delivered at the conference in Montpellier in September 1981. Several of the papers address topics of interest to the study of combined operations at the theater level, particularly: Frank E. Vandiver, "The AEF and the French Connection, 1917-1918" (Paper M); Richard A. Hunt, "America's Allies in Vietnam" (Paper P); and B. Franklin Cooling and John A. Hixson, "Twentieth Century Allied Interoperability" (Paper B).

Jessup, Maurice E. **Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Coalition General.** Student Research Paper, US Army War College, 3 March 1967. Colonel Jessup reviews major actions and attitudes of General Eisenhower as an Allied commander and concludes that his most significant and lasting contribution was the fact that he developed the techniques and principles under which the allied staff and command structure functioned in order to make allied unity and coalition warfare succeed.

Leighton, Richard M. "Allied Unity of Command in the Second World War: A study in Regional Military Organization," **Political Science Quarterly**, 67, no. 3 (September 1952), 399-425. An excellent study of the problem of unity of command in coalition warfare in World War II based on DA documents and materials collected for the writing of the United State Army in World War II series.

Miranda, Guttemberg A. "Interallied Military Cooperation," *Military Review*, 31, no. 11 (February 1952), 85-90. Translated reprint of an article by Brazilian Army LTC Miranda which appeared in *Defense Nacional*, February 1951, covering the problems of interallied military cooperation based on the experience of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy in World War II.

Palmer, Williston B. "Commanders Must Know Logistics," *Army Information Digest*, 8, no. 4 (April 1953), 2-14. This article by LTG Palmer, then ACS G-4, DA, is a condensation of a lecture by General Palmer at the Army War College on his return from Korea where he commanded X Corps. In it he admonishes would-be commanders to remember "the facts of life" among which are the need for the commander to consider logistics in everything he does. LTG Palmer also addresses some of the problems associated with logistical support of allies based on his World War II and Korean War experience.

Paulick, Michael. "Command in a Combined Theater of Operations," *Military Review*, 30, no. 9 (December 1950), 51-62. LTC Paulick, then an instructor at USACGSC, discusses the purely military problems of command, logistic support and liaison in a combined theater of operations (using SHAEF/ETO to illustrate his points) focussing on the command structure and staff organization designed to meet such problems.

Peckham, Elisha O. "Organization of Combined Military Effort," *Military Review*, 30, no. 8 (November 1950), 46-50. LTC Peckham, then an instructor at Leavenworth, argues that the problems of a defensive coalition of free and independent nations are many and complex and that among them are the selection of common objectives, unity of command, and the employment of available forces.

Pogue, Forrest C. *The Supreme Command*. (United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations). Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954. 607 pages. Historian Pogue's major study of SHAEF in World War II deals with the command exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander and decisions made by the Supreme Allied Commander and his staff and the operations conducted under the aegis of the Supreme Headquarters. A volume in the official US Army History of World War II, the purpose of this volume is "to tell how the Supreme Allied Command prosecuted the war against the enemy in northwest Europe in 1944-45. A part of that story has to do with the way in which an integrated command, devoted to the Allied cause, waged one of the most effective coalition wars in history."

- Romanus, Charles F. and Riley Sunderland. **Stilwell's Command Problems.** (United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater). Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1956. 518 pages. This volume in the official US Army history of World War II "presents the problems of a commander, his staff, and his troops in a position so irregular and complex as to be unprecedented in US Army history, and outlines the background of their position in Allied policy, military and political. Their position was determined by an arrangement among allies, one accepted with reservations by the War Department."
- Scott, Franklin E. **Logistic Support of Combined Operations.** Student Research Paper, US Army War College, 14 March 1955. Colonel Scott examines the problems of the United States in providing logistical support to combined forces during war.
- Skillman, Charles Spencer. **Authority of an Allied Commander (Comparable to SACEUR) with Respect to Logistical Activities.** Student Research Paper, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, 15 November 1954. LTC Skillman reviews the terms of reference and other guidance provided to SACEUR and takes into consideration historical experience in preparing his recommendations as to the minimum essential control that an Allied Supreme Commander must have over logistical activities within his theater to insure the success of a major allied offensive.
- Smith, W. Bedell. "Problems at an Integrated Headquarters," **Journal of the Royal United Service Institution**, 90, no. 560 (November 1945), 455-462. General Smith was US Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, in World War II. Here he discusses briefly some of the key problems encountered at SHAEF headquarters.
- Stuckey, John D. "Echelons Above Corps," **Parameters: The Journal of the US Army War College**, 13, no. 4 (December 1983), 39-47. Colonel Stuckey, a research analyst with the Strategic Studies Institute, argues the need for a standard doctrine and organization for echelons above corps in the US Army.
- Thomas, William N. "Combined Staff Leadership," **Military Review**, 45, no. 1 (January 1965), 35-42. Major Thomas discusses the problems which face a leader on a combined staff. Derived from his study of combined staff leadership and especially the responses to a questionnaire circulated to students of the senior service colleges in 1963-1964. What is said of staff leadership is also germane to the commander's role.

Tripp, Richard L. **Analysis and Comparison of Generals Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA Ret., and Mark W. Clark, USA Ret.** Student Research Paper, US Army War College, 30 May 1974,. LTC Tripp's study represents the compilation of the concepts, views, and philosophies of Generals Wedemeyer and Clark, as stated in their interview series as a part of the Senior Officer Debriefing [Oral History] Program, as well as a comparison of the two generals.

United States Army, American Expeditionary Forces. **Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Command-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.** Washington: USGPO, 1920. 96 pages and plates. This is General Pershing's final official report of the organization and operations of the A.E.F. in World War I dated 1 September 1919.

Wedemeyer, Albert C. (General, USA). **USAWC/USAMHI Senior Officer Oral History Program Interview** by Colonel Anthony J. Deskis. 1973. Nothing applicable toward the development of the Combined Army Operations report.

PART II: KOREA

INTRODUCTION

"The first major allied combat operation after World War II took place in Korea, 1950-1953. Following North Korea's invasion of her southern neighbor, the Republic of Korea (ROK), on 25 June 1950, the United Nations quickly resolved to take cooperative action against this breach of the peace. The U.N. Security Council called for immediate cessation of hostilities, for withdrawal of North Korean armed forces from South Korean soil, and for 'all Members to render every assistance to the North Korean authorities.' The Security Council resolved further on the night of 27 June to ask member nations of the U.N. to give military aid to South Korea. The Korean War ended with an armistice three years and one month later, following expenditure of nearly one-half million U.N. casualties and over 1.5 million Communist North Korean and Chinese casualties. In the interim, some twenty-two different nations participated in some manner on the two sides during what the American President styled a "police action" at the time".

The above paragraph is from a historical analysis done by Hixson and Cooling and sets the stage for a review of the combined forces operations in this war. More definitive bibliographical information is included at the end of this part.

CLARITY AND FIRMNESS OF DIRECTIVES

General J. Lawton Collins in his autobiography, *Lightning Joe* writes "... Our participation in the undeclared war in Korea followed the surprise attack on June 25, 1950, by North Korea across the 38th Parallel, which marked its boundary with South Korea. This attack by forces armed by the Soviet Union and trained by the Russians for offensive operations was in flagrant violation of the Cairo Declaration of 1943, in which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, later joined by Stalin, pledged a unified and independent Korea. Following the attack, the United Nations Security Council, in the absence of the Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, approved a resolution condemning the attack, demanding withdrawal of the attackers, and calling on all members 'to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.'... On June 27, Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, appealed to the United Nations for assistance. The same day the Security Council, with the Soviet delegate still absent, again condemned the attack, but this time called on members of the United Nations to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea to repel the attack and restore peace and security. This resolution laid the groundwork for participation by the United States and other UN members in support of the Republic of Korea.

North Korean troops broke through the last organized resistance north of Seoul on June 28. The following morning President Truman reviewed the situation with Secretaries Dean Acheson and Louis Johnson, the JCS, and other top advisers in State and Defense. With the complete agreement of those present, the President authorized MacArthur to use US Army combat troops to secure a port and air base in the Pusan area at the southern tip of Korea and undertake other measures, including the employment of naval and air forces in North Korea, with the hope of preventing the overrunning of all Republic of Korea (ROK) Territory. That morning MacArthur had flown to Korea to gauge personally the seriousness of the situation. His report, which I received for the JCS about midnight of June 29-30, stated that the only assurance that ROK forces would be able to check the North Koreans would be introduction of US combat ground forces. He concluded that if authorized he intended to send immediately to Korea a US Army RCT and to provide for a possible counteroffensive by two divisions from his troops in Japan."

Although the wheels were turning at the United Nations for a Combined Force, clearly at this time the US decision makers were unilaterally committing a US force for combat, regardless of support which might come from other countries.

After the Security Council's call for United Nations support on June 27, a third resolution was adopted On July 7, 1950, of which the chief provisions were as recorded by General Collins: ... "3. Recommends that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions [of June 25 and 27] make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States. 4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces. 5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating."

Collins continues, "MacArthur was designated Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, by President Truman on July 8, and a week later President Rhee placed all ROK forces under MacArthur's command. Thus, for the first time in our history, the United States embarked in peacetime on a major war in a far-off country that many Americans had never heard of, a war that began without a congressional declaration and ended without a peace treaty. It was unique also because, though the United States furnished the bulk of the troops, equipment, supplies, and leadership, it was fought by an international force under the aegis of the United Nations. Consequently the United States did not have complete freedom of action in the conduct of the war..."

Hixson and Cooling write "... At first, other nations responded to the UN call primarily with offers of food and medical supplies, as well as air and naval support. Only the Republic of China (Nationalist

China) offered ground troops. This offer was rejected not only for political reasons but also because '... Nationalist Chinese troops were considered to be untrained and had no artillery or motor transport.' It soon became apparent, however, that United Nations ground forces would be required, and by the end of June not only the United States but other member nations responded to such a need.

Early in the war, American public opinion also began to demand contributions from other UN members, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington requested MacArthur to suggest how such aid might be solicited. Although there appears to have been no study of concrete lessons learned from the World War II Allied experience, such experience was certainly fresh in the minds of most military men of the time. Thus MacArthur lost little time in responding on July 15 with formal recognition of the political necessity for such contributions and stating that his headquarters was 'in complete sympathy with the concept of an international force.' He recommended that some 1,000 ground units be so supplied by other UN members..."

General Collins continues "Following the fall of Seoul on June 28, the first thing that had to be done was to stop the onrushing North Korean (NK) forces north of the port of Pusan. This task was assigned to Lieutenant General Walton H. "Johnny" Walker, commander of the US Eighth Army in Japan, three divisions of which were moved to Korea as rapidly as possible. They were joined in August by the 1st Marine Brigade and 2nd Infantry Division from the States and by the British 27th Infantry Brigade, the first non-American United Nations reinforcement. In mid-July, President Rhee placed the ROK Army under the operational control of the Eighth Army. Thereafter, Walker wisely issued his instructions to the ROK forces through General Chung Il Kwon, Chief of Staff, ROK Army. Walker set up his headquarters in Taegu, sixty miles north of Pusan.

Walker checkmated each successive NK probing advance by the skillful shifting of his scant reserves, chiefly Colonel John H. Michaelis' 27th RCT and Brigadier General Edward A. Craig's 1st Marine Brigade. They were supported by the US Fifth Air Force, without which Johnny Walker said, 'we would not have been able to stay in Korea.' By September 12 the NK Army had been halted along the UN perimeter defenses north of Pusan."

Although the preceding paragraph credits Walker with checkmating successive NK probes, as well it should, for he was indeed the Commander on the ground, nevertheless, it is clear that up until the time Ridgway assumed command of Eighth Army that control had really been retained in Tokyo. General Collins writes about a visit to Korea in December 1950 to assess the situation after the Chinese had entered the war. He writes, "I spent most of the next day in Tokyo with General MacArthur and his staff, trying to sort out their views of the options available to the UN Command. MacArthur's chief point was that

unless his Command was given substantial reinforcements very shortly it should be withdrawn from Korea. I did not argue the point but I did not agree, basing my opinion on my discussions with the field commanders who were confident that they would hold off the Chinese. I so reported to the JCS and the President. Shortly thereafter, on the recommendation of General Wright, CINUNC's G-3, who had shown good judgment throughout, MacArthur authorized the X Corps to withdraw from the Hungnam area, and reluctantly passed control of the X Corps to the Eighth Army. The Chinese did not attempt to interfere with the withdrawal of the X Corps, but a cruel fate stepped in as Johnny Walker was about to take command of a united Eighth Army, which rightly should have been his long before. On a road north of Seoul on December 23 he was killed instantly when the jeep in which he was riding was struck by a truck. It was a sad and inglorious end for a fine, gallant field commander."

General Ridgway in his oral history and also his book *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* writes of his meeting with MacArthur in Japan prior to arriving in Korea to assume command of Eighth Army. He writes: "... At nine, I saw General MacArthur. In a masterly briefing, he covered all the points I had in mind to ask him. As I rose to go, I asked one question. 'General' I said, 'if I get over there and find the situation warrants it, do I have your permission to attack?' A broad grin broke out on the old gentleman's face. 'Do what you think best, Matt,' he said. 'The Eighth Army is yours.' That is the sort of orders that puts heart into a soldier. Now the full responsibilities were mine; not to be delegated, as authority may be delegated, but indivisibly and ceaselessly mine, day and night, as every commander's responsibilities are his alone, from theater to infantry squad--from five stars to two stripes. Command responsibilities -- for as long as it might please God and my superiors to keep me on the job. ..."

General Collins basically concludes his discussion of the Korean War with the following account "... Matt Ridgway's qualifications for his new command were unexcelled. Within the past year he had visited Japan and Korea and had kept abreast of the situation. He had all the confidence, drive, and aggressive spirit to revive the flagging morale of the Eighth and ROK Armies after the reversals they had suffered from the massive Chinese forces. Fortunately, also, MacArthur was now ready to give Ridgway a free hand in command of UN forces in the field. No longer would they be controlled from Tokyo.

The combat operations of the Korean War need no further recounting here. Ridgway's brilliant success in stopping the Chinese forces and then driving them back north of the 38th parallel are well documented in the official histories published by the Chief of Military History of the Department of the Army, in *My War in Peacetime*, and in other personal accounts..."

To fully analyze the problem of "characteristic lack of clarity and firmness of directives received from the next superior combined headquarters or authority" would obviously take considerable research and require making the assessment at Eighth Army level. It appears from this cursory effort that unquestionably MacArthur, at least in the first six months of the war over-supervised and to a degree fragmented Eighth Army (e.g., retained control at UNC Headquarters and kept X Corps under his immediate control until General Ridgway assumed command). Rather than lacking firmness and clarity it well may be that there was too much control from the higher headquarters.

From the UNC level it would appear that after the initial resolutions, the UN left operational direction of the war with the United States.

CONFLICTING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PROBLEMS

As stated earlier by Hixson and Cooling "MacArthur was in complete sympathy with the concept of an international force. He recommended that some 1000 ground units be so supplied by other UN members. They should consist basically of infantry, with supporting artillery, and bring with them equipment and weapons using US ammunition. Service and combat support units were to be of a size and integrity to facilitate immediate utilization. These UN units were to be attached to various US regimental and divisional-size units or absorbed into a service command. Where possible they were to use the basic allied language in Korea, English. MacArthur further wanted all UN units to possess sufficient numbers of personnel capable of speaking and understanding that language. Thus MacArthur very quickly advanced the two pillars of allied interoperability--standardization of weapons and ammunition, and language commonality as a means of communication..." By mid August 1950, eighteen nations had promised military aid to the UN command in Korea. Stateside planners anticipated some 25,000 to 35,000 allied troops to be provided. A formal integration policy for an allied force in Korea had evolved within a month and although the architects of this integration policy are not clearly identified,, the implication is that it was conceived by the American military planners. In any case the Eighth US Army Korea (EUSAK) received responsibility for executing it.

Some of the economic and military problems of the allied powers are presented by Hixson and Cooling. They devote little attention or mention of political problems although any problem between allied forces is certainly a political problem in one sense.

It soon became apparent to EUSAK that some system on integrating allied forces into the UN command was necessary. Accordingly, Hixson and Cooling write..." The impending arrival of a Thai regiment, a

Turkish brigade, and a Greek expeditionary force made some decision on how to integrate allied troops into the UN command imperative by early October. Finally, on 7 October, EUSAK headquarters directed the Commanding General, 2d Logistical Command, to establish a United Nations Reception Center (UNRC) on the site of Taegu University. The UNRC's mission was 'to clothe, equip and provide familiarization training with US Army weapons and equipment to UN troops as determined essential for operations in Korea by the Reception Center Commander.' No more than 6,200 troops were to be trained at the center during any given period. From 18 October 1950 until 15 June 1951, UNRC processed units from Thailand, India, the Netherlands, France, Greece, Ethiopia, Belgium and Luxembourg; retrained at least 12,000 American service troops as combat units...Perhaps the greatest service provided by UNRC was one of information and education. This centralized processing facility enabled EUSAK and UN commanders to learn--or relearn--the demands of operations with allied forces long before integration into combat. For example, the process began with the first UN contingent processed through UNRC, the 5,000-man Turkish brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Tahshin Yazicio. Colonel Thomas S. Gunby's American advisory team accompanied the Turks from Istanbul, and aided in the training. In fact, it probably speeded up the training cycle planned at UNRC because the Turks had already received basic American-style preparation before reaching the theater. They were anxious to go into combat and needed only three weeks of UNRC training, rather than the forty-five days predicted by the UNRC staff. Weapons familiarization training at Taegu uncovered only that the Turks preferred 'Kentucky windage' in sighting their weapons to the set piece American arrangements, that they were possibly more aggressive than the Americans wanted, and that their vehicle drivers were shepherds, farm boys, and other unmechanical young soldiers; hence the brigade might have functioned better with fewer organic vehicles."

Some of the culture lessons learned covered a wide gamut of areas. The UN Reception Center Staff learned that the Turks frowned on group showers and that different rations were required for different nations (e.g. no pork for the Turks). The Turks also believed that American servicemen received tobacco, radios, wristwatches and laundry service without charge. The Thai contingent also required a special ration (more rice). Since the US was providing clothing and equipment, a problem was encountered primarily because of the size of the Thai soldier. The Ethiopians arrived in Korea equipped and dressed for warm weather operations. Language was a problem throughout. Other difficulties addressed included poor hygiene, no autopsies for the dead, training, sophisticated weapons and communications equipment.

These problems are those recognized by the operators on the ground. Interestingly, General Ridgway in his oral history noted the absence of any significant problem as he looked back at his tenure as EUSAK commander and later as Supreme Commander Far East.

LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES

Brigadier General Taek Hyung Rhee in his Monograph titled "US ROK Combined Operations: A Korean Perspective", cited the policy of standardizing equipment by providing US weapons and ammunition in large measure for a workable logistical system during the Korean war. He contended that much of what was needed to turn the various units into one homogenous body was developed through trial and error.

Hixson and Cooling provide considerable detail on the logistic systems operating during this period. Some of the more significant points are extracted as follows: "... Three separate and parallel supply systems functioned during the Korean War. The principal one naturally as that of the United States, since that nation provided the bulk of clothing, rations, equipment, and weapons used by all US and attached UN units, excepting those of the British Commonwealth. The British maintained a separate supply line, while the ROK forces maintained their own, with both allies receiving a portion of their supplies from American sources. Thus, a principle of providing supplies on a reimbursable basis became the underpinning for allied logistics. It required EUSAK to establish a method of material supply, maintenance of records, and a system of accountability so that the United States government could later request reimbursement based upon adequate and accurate information. But in addition to the reimbursement question, problem areas of importance also included clothing, dietary needs, vehicular and weapons maintenance, as well as medical evacuation...

...The United States logistics base in Japan largely enabled it to provide the greater proportion of logistical support for the UN effort in Korea. Co-mingling of the UN Contingents and the common pool of supply support in Korea made it difficult if not impossible to ascertain the nature and amount of support actually received by individual UN forces. Ultimately, the Quartermaster Corps, Far East Command, and EUSAK established the basis upon which settlements could be made on a voluntary basis by participating nations to the United States for men, money, and material. At first, it was relatively simple for US Department of the Army to merely task EUSAK through the Quartermaster Corps, Far East Command, to report weekly and monthly on the amount of support rendered the only other participant, the Republic of Korea. But after August, the influx of UN contingents made problems of logistical support far more complex... But by the time the full UN force closed on Korea, all UN forces in general, excepting the British and South Korean, were attached to an American division for logistical support. These UN units were issued all classes of supplies as authorized by EUSAK. The S-4 of the parent US regiments issued supplies in all cases except that of a brigade-size unit, which was supplied by division or corps G-4, depending upon attachment. All issues of Class I and Class IV items to UN troops (excepting ROK and British Commonwealth forces) were processed by US units in US supply

lines. Class III item issues were made to all UN troops through US channels. Controlled items were allocated directly to UN units by EUSAK, with requisition and issue through US division channels... Another confused logistical problem resulted from UN and ROK operation and maintenance of equipment. The ROK forces particularly were handicapped by a conglomeration of vehicles, lack of sufficient organic maintenance organization and control, and lack of maintenance equipment. Replacement parts were lacking for obsolete ROK material, Thai and Filipino troops were judged incapable of handling medium tanks or cold weather maintenance, and Greek troops had so little experience with mechanization that upon debarkation they drove many of their vehicles from Pusan to Suwon, some 250 miles, with little or no grease. While the Dutch provided few vehicle or weapons maintenance problems, the French were so accustomed to cannibalizing their US supplied World War II equipment for spare parts that they had to undergo extensive training to learn new maintenance standards and techniques for replacement equipment.

The diverse maintenance requirements placed a great burden on US ordnance outfits, which were charged not only with support of American but also UN forces. The number of ordnance units was based solely on the strength of US forces to be supported. Yet they provided wholesale depot supply of ordnance Class V items to the French, Turkish, Greek, Dutch, Thai, Belgian, Filipino, Ethiopian, Columbian and ROK units..."

Ridgway's comment in his Oral History stated "Syngman Rhee's continual urging on to the Yalu or else he would go alone...'It was laughable because he couldn't have gotten anywhere. We had control of all the logistic support".

ARMAMENT, TRAINING AND TACTICAL DOCTRINES

Again, Hixson and Cooling give the best description of the differences in tactics and doctrine of the allied forces in the Korean War. They write "... Notwithstanding the conscious attempt at standardization along American lines, the diversity of an international force such as EUSAK suggested some differences in tactical concepts and doctrine. Since the two major powers, the United States and Great Britain, provided the bulk of military doctrinal concepts, it was here that differences arose most clearly in the interoperability framework.

The British, for example, favored holding the high ground when on defense, whereas American doctrine stressed holding the bases of the slopes to obtain maximum effect with 'grazing and interlocking fire' from automatic weapons. The British failed to make extensive use of outposts in the defense, and held to different terms, patterns, and reporting procedures than the Americans when it came to laying mine fields. Such thinking had been previously communicated to Turkish and Belgian forces via Britain's pre-Korean War association with those

nations' armed forces as advisers and suppliers of weapons and equipment. What this did was to introduce a certain amount of difficulty in the exchange of sectors between US-and British-trained units.


The UN units attached to US commands consciously attempted to pattern their actions after their mentors. Many of the UN officers themselves had attended US service schools or had been otherwise exposed to US tactical doctrine. This did not prevent difficulties, however, such as accomplishing a boundary tie-in between the US 1st Cavalry Division and as an adjacent UN unit..."

General Tack Hyung Rhee presented these differences between ROK and US tactics:

<u>Tactics For</u>	<u>ROK</u>	<u>US</u>
Conventional Offense	Seizure & retention of key terrain	Destruction of enemy force. Fast maneuver operations
Conventional Defense	Same as US	Line, area, position mobile
Airborne/Air Mobile	Smaller force, command and control differences	Larger force (e.g. Division size)
Amphibious Tactics	Not developed due to lack of craft	Developed procedures and exercises

Hixson and Cooling summarize these differences between US and ROK "...Finally, ROK divisions--although otherwise standardized to American doctrine--always lacked clear doctrine for the employment of supporting weapons, tanks, and close air support. Frequently, ROK commanders allowed subordinate regiments, companies, and battalions to become so intermixed as to defy recognizable chains of command.

The organization of the UN Command/Far East Command, Major Ground Forces, 1 July 1951 is shown at Figure A.



SOURCE: Hq Eighth Army, Command Report, ACofS, G-3, bk. 4, pt. 1, 1 Jul 51; DOD General Officers Assignment List, 1 Jul 51, in OCM files, and as shown in Walter G. Hermes, Truce, Tent and Fighting Front, p. 57.

FIGURE A

PERSONAL INTERVENTION

From General Collins' book, *Lightning Joe*, it is evident that at least for the first six months of the war, General MacArthur was personally and intimately involved in all aspects of the war. Some critics see this as over supervision but the fact is his personal reputation and prestige were so great that initially, at least he certainly assured success by his personal involvement.

General Ridgway as EUSAK commander was personally on a day by day basis involved in his Army's operations. There are numerous accounts, in his book and in the oral history, of his personal involvement as a troop leader.

Little is known about the personal involvement of the allied leaders. General Collins writes "In mid-July President Rhee placed the ROK Army under the operational control of the Eighth Army." Thereafter, Walker wisely issued his instructions to the ROK forces through General Chung Il Kwon, Chief of Staff ROK Army.

Hixson and Cooling write about the commander of the French forces... "But a unique feature of the French experience proved to be its commander, a lieutenant general with a distinguished record of World War II combat and Resistance experience, but who had volunteered as a lieutenant colonel. Colonel Charles R. Margin Vernerey, fast approaching retirement age but with a lust for combat, used the nom de guerre "Montclar" and proceeded to provide a colorful, inspirational leader for his command; he was often addressed as "Mon general" by his men in Korea."

PERSONALITIES OF SENIOR COMMANDERS

General Marshall writing in the foreword of General Ridgway's book, *Soldier*, states "... General Ridgway has firmly established himself in history as a great battle leader. The advance of his Army Corps to the Baltic in the last phase of the war in Europe was sensational to those fully informed of the rapidly moving events of that day. His campaign in Korea will be rated as a classic of personal leadership. As Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty organization in Europe, he did a splendid job. And he culminated his military career as Chief of Staff of the Army..."

General Collins writes first about General Walker's death in a jeep accident... "It was a sad and inglorious end for a fine, gallant field commander"... and then more about Ridgway..."When MacArthur learned of Walker's death he personally advised me and asked that Ridgway, who was then serving as my Deputy for Operations, be sent over at once. I informed the President, Secretaries Marshall and Pace, and the JCS, recommending approval. The President promptly designated General

Ridgway as Commander of the Eighth Army. I telephoned Matt at once, giving him the word. Great soldier that he always was, without waiting to spend Christmas with his family he left Washington the next morning and arrived in Tokyo shortly before midnight, Christmas Day, 1950.

Matt Ridgway's qualifications for his new command were unexcelled. Within the past year he had visited Japan and Korea and had kept abreast of the situation. He had all the confidence, drive, and aggressive spirit to revive the flagging morale of the Eighth and ROK Armies after the reversals they had suffered from the massive Chinese forces. Fortunately, also, MacArthur was now ready to give Ridgway a free hand in command of UN forces in the field. No longer would they be controlled from Tokyo.

One Allied Commander, Colonel Marian C. Azusin, Commander of the Philippine battalion was, in the words of Hixson and Cooling..."eventually relieved at the specific request of US commanders. The general consensus after the relief was that this situation could have been avoided if there had been some sort of UN reception center for staging, training, equipping and orienting newly arriving UN contingents before commitment to action..." What this situation was has not been determined in the scope of this research. Additionally, given more time and research effort it is obvious that this section could be greatly expanded to consider all the allied commanders, US commanders at least to the Division level as well as the Commanders of the other services (e.g. Marines, Navy and Air Force). Likewise, nothing further is presented on MacArthur since it would not materially add to this effort.

SUMMARY

Perhaps all combined operations are unique. Certainly they all are different but the Korean War seems best described in the annals of Combined Operations as unique. Unique in its initiation, unique in the number of countries included in the allied forces and in the way these forces were employed. The rapidity with which the force was established should not be overlooked. General Ridgway in his oral history made two very significant statements which have not been included in this paper up to this point. He was asked what problems he had dealing with the allies in the Korean conflict. Ridgway responded "I had none. I had most harmonious relationships with all of the 16 combat elements there, their commanding officers and their diplomatic representatives in Tokyo." The other point has to do with doctrine. He was asked "Did you feel that American military doctrine was adequate for limited war encountered in Korea?" Ridgway answered, "I don't think that at that time American doctrine (you'd have to refer to basic field manuals) contemplated limited war."

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PART III: NATO


INTRODUCTION

At the conclusion of World War II in Europe, the victorious Allies came to recognize the absence of the traditional balance of power. This led to the initiation of some type of security arrangements between the various allied nations. In 1948 when the Czechoslovak Communist Party seized power, the allied nations comprised of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium signed the Brussels treaty, binding themselves to a collective self-defense treaty for fifty years. The formation of this alliance was significant in two ways. One, it renewed the inherent problems of combined command and two, it provided the nucleus of what was to prove to be the forerunner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See Figure B. [Hixson and Cooling, 278].

This new alliance was named the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO). WUDO perpetuated some of the traditional Anglo-French alliance difficulties, as experienced in the very early days of World War II, including command relationships and logistics issues according to Hixson and Cooling. They continue " Nevertheless, organizational features of WUDO suggested lessons learned from the war. Each of the three ground, sea, and air headquarters reflected complete integration. They served three commanders in chief charged with preparation of combined plans for the employment of all forces of the service which they represented. A single supreme commander -- WUDO styled the office "Permanent Military President" -- would command all forces in time of emergency through his respective commanders in chief. But, as seems almost customary in alliance operations in which British and French play preeminent roles, the difficult question of who possessed the professional stature to be Supreme Commander or President came quickly to the fore. Enter at that point the two foremost candidates from their respective countries -- Montgomery and De Lattre.

Montgomery won out in the end, and he and De Lattre, subsequently his principal land force commander, ironed out their differences during a long and tempestuous relationship. No Russians appeared west of the Rhine, and the various combined staffs at Fontainebleau and elsewhere moved ahead with the basic business of reestablishing staff cooperation in an integrated headquarters. Above all, political-military figures in various national government ministries echoed the thinking expressed by French Prime Minister Henry Quille: ' The United States must never let France and Western Europe be invaded by Russia in the same way that they were by Germany.' America remained aloof from WUDO formally, but from the summer of 1948 onward, both American and Canadian observers began attending meetings of the WUDO defense committee. Thus, the stage was set for US and Canadian participation in the formation of NATO."

Planning Structure of the Western Union



¹ In time of emergency will function as Supreme Commander Uniforce

Source: Elisha O. Peckham, "Organization for Combined Military Effort," Military Review 30 (November 1950), 46-50.

FIGURE B

A review of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer's Oral History reveals that he was the primary action officer in the Department of Defense at the time NATO was being planned and was the DOD representative on the planning committee chaired by the State Department. General Lemnitzer tells of the difficulty of this assignment since Louis A. Johnson, then Secretary of Defense, was opposed to alliances and NATO in particular. Be that as it may on 4 April 1949, eleven nations plus the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty and NATO was born.

Again Hixson and Cooling write "...But in 1949 the immediate necessity came from military deterrence of an apparently aggressive Soviet Union. Neither the admission of Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1954, nor the withdrawal of France from the alliance's military structure twelve years later have fundamentally altered the focus of the community. Similarly, the overwhelming reliance on American (with British and French counterpart) nuclear forces has always provided the ultimate weapon underpinning the alliance. Numerous books and articles have examined NATO's military strategies and programs for its thirty-year history, to a point that at least one American university has an established Center for NATO studies. Nevertheless, very few military or civilian students of the alliance have attempted to catalog and evaluate the actual operational capabilities of this coalition as they have developed over the years.

At least one commentator has perceived NATO as an alliance with no real military history--only hypothetical plans, rehearsals for contingencies and "A chronicle of political-military concerns, strategic concepts, and preparatory activities." He suggests a tripartite history of the alliance -- an initial decade of confidence and nuclear deterrence, a second ten years moving to "flexible response" (an admittedly American term), and finally, a third decade focusing on a strategy of rapid reinforcement. But he is quick to point out the truism of Clausewitz that "...war and politics inextricably run together and ... there can be no such thing as a purely military matter until one arrives at the lowliest details of routine operations.' If that proposition is true in the affairs of individual nations, it is even more so in those of NATO".

CLARITY AND FIRMNESS OF DIRECTIVES

To evaluate the clarity and firmness of directives in the NATO arena it is necessary to recognize how these directives are developed. James R. Huntley in his book, *The NATO Story* writes "Decisions in NATO are generally taken by unanimous consent, although the Treaty does not require this. (After the French withdrawal from NATO's military activities in 1966), it was clearly demonstrated that one member country could not stand in the way of others who wished to move ahead in cooperation. The United Nations Security Council must have unanimity in order to act and has often been paralyzed by this rule at

crucial times. In NATO the desire for unity is served as a pressing invitation to conciliate and there has rarely been a question of "veto"; the clear common purposes and a fundamental consensus on principles have brought about agreement so far on the most vital matters, with few exceptions. The very processes of the alliance are clear demonstration of the reality and vitality of the 'Atlantic idea.'"

Huntley continues "The job of organizing--of putting the "O" on the "NAT"--began. The council prescribed in the Treaty consisted of the Foreign Ministers of the member countries, but obviously these busy men could not meet often. It was therefore agreed that each would send a permanent representative to NATO headquarters (until 1952 London, thereafter Paris, and since 1967 Brussels), who would sit daily with his colleagues. These were to be men of senior rank, and they soon were supported by staffs drawn from several departments of their governments, including foreign offices, defense ministries and treasuries. As the years went on, their task was broadened to include not only the functioning of NATO itself, but the delicate business of trying to concert the separate foreign policies, often with respect to matters in far-off Asia or Africa. Today, the Permanent Representatives constitute in effect a permanent council of the governments of the fifteen countries, so organized that they can meet continuously. Their meetings can be official, or they can be informal, with no agenda and no record of decisions. When necessary, as in 1957, the chiefs of government themselves may meet to deliberate.

An international secretariat was set up to serve the Council and to direct what was to become a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from airfield construction and oceanographic research to the organization of civil defense and the granting of university scholarships, all managed through an elaborate system of international committees. To head this secretariat and to serve as day-to-day chairman of the North Atlantic Council, Lord Ismay was first chosen. The new Secretary General had been secretary to the British War Cabinet under Churchill and understood well the organization of defense and the functioning of a great military alliance. For what had happened in the fateful years from 1939 to 1945 had great relevance to the job before NATO in 1949.

To defeat Hitler, the wartime Allies had set up a Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and also a Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces--SHAEF--under General Dwight D. Eisenhower. From its seat in the south of England, SHAEF had organized, trained, and commanded the vast Allied forces which descended on Normandy in 1944. NATO's problem five years later was not dissimilar, but with an important difference; NATO was to prevent a war, not to fight one. Harking back to what had worked well in both World Wars, the NATO Council proceeded to create a joint structure of international military command.

Under the Council, a permanent Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the members, was set up to oversee the defense effort. The Committee, NATO's highest military authority, meets twice each year; permanent Military Representatives, deputies for the Chiefs of Staff, are continuously in Brussels and do the work of the Military Committee in the intervening periods. A Standing Group was created initially as executive for the Military Committee, comprising one senior officer each from France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, to work out strategic directives. (France withdrew from the Military Committee and the standing Group in 1966; the latter body was then disbanded.) At NATO headquarters, there is now an integrated International Military Staff, to insure that policies and decisions of the Military Committee are carried out."

Considering the above described organization it is surprising that NATO operations have moved as timely and smoothly as they have. A case in point reveals that the Council decided just before Christmas 1950 to create a combined military force in Europe and ask President Truman to designate General Eisenhower to serve as Supreme Allied Commander. On 2 April 1951, Eisenhower arrived in Paris and set up his command. This action, occurring within 90 days is significant, but more importantly by the end of 1951, six new divisions (4 American and 2 British) had been added to the allied forces on the Continent.

At the operational level, General Ridgway in his book *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* writes of an issue as to whether the Supreme Allied Commander, who was an American should also be Commander in Chief of the US Armed Forces in Europe or if the two posts should be separated. Ridgway writes "Early in June, I reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that by all means the two posts of highest authority should be vested in the same individual. Though the Supreme Allied Commander was responsible to the North Atlantic Council, the supreme political body of NATO, as the senior US officer in the field he would undeniably be held responsible, by the American people, for whatever happened to American forces in Europe. In case of trouble, the American troops on the ground would be instantly responsive to the orders of the Supreme Commander. There would be no need for "co-ordination," which is often a synonym for red tape and delay. SACEUR, in his other capacity as Commander in Chief United States Forces, could issue direct operational orders to the commanders of all the US Army, Navy, and Air Force elements stationed on the continent of Europe.

This recommendation was approved, and it is the organization which exists today, though there are, and have been, strong arguments advanced for dividing these responsibilities between two individuals.

At the tactical level regarding directives and orders Huntley writes of the following incident as observed in NATO in 1969.

"We are at a military airfield in the West German Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, the headquarters of a wing of the Second Allied Tactical Air Force. The British Wing Commander confers with his Belgian deputy. There is a simulated attack from beyond the Iron Curtain, 80 miles east, and ATAF has been forewarned throughout the NATO Forward Scatter System, an advanced communications network which bounces unjammable radio transmissions from ionosphere and troposphere. The commander orders three squadrons into the air, one Dutch, one American, one British. Less than two minutes from command, pilots--some actually waiting in their planes--are airborne. At airfields dotted all over Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the same order has gone out and a solid defense is in the air. NATO is ready."

Looking at the clarity and firmness of directives is not to suggest by what is presented here, that there are not problems. Certainly there are many, but what is encouraging is the evidence that through various programs such as language training, meetings at all levels, schools etc., the NATO organization is successfully dealing with this issue.

CONFLICTING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PROBLEMS

Benjamin F. Schemmer, *Armed Forces Journal International*/April 1989 in an article titled "Soviet Arms Control Initiatives Upstage NATO's 40th Anniversary" writes, "...Worner (NATO's Secretary General) is obviously sensitive to critics who now call the North Atlantic Treaty Organization more of a debating society than an alliance. It spends too much time rehashing old issues, they say. As Congressman Les Aspin (D-WI), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, put it at the Wehrkunde meeting, 'We look like a bunch of bookkeepers, while Gorbachev looks like he has a vision of the world (March AFJI). We need a plan, we need a goal. ... Our response to Gorbachev's proposals is too modest,' he charged. 'We haven't invested enough intellectual capital on where we want to go.'

Too much of NATO's intellectual capital is spent, other critics charge, debating the same issues that NATO leaders wrestled with a quarter of a century ago--what constitutes equitable burden-sharing; the integrity of NATO's nuclear deterrent; the soundness of its flexible response strategy; how real the threat is; and the specter of American troop withdrawals...

But after decades of debate, the topic seems more divisive than ever--and this year, it may come to a head. The prospect of unilateral American troop withdrawals is tied strongly to that issue. Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), the new Chairwoman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, headed a special panel on burden-sharing last year that in August reported:

'The United States is spending \$160-170 billion on NATO--and that is significantly more than the defense contributions of the other 15 NATO members put together.' It added, 'The Europeans had better be prepared to defend their own territory without a large scale US ground commitment, because that commitment cannot be guaranteed forever.'"

The above words leave no doubt along with NATO's forty year history that there have been a myriad of conflicts-political, economic and military among the allied powers. No effort is made here to delineate these conflicts, rather to call attention to the fact that with this many nations involved in the alliance, conflicts should be viewed more as the norm than the exception.

Ridgway includes in his book..."At about the time I took over, all the problems facing the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe underwent a fundamental alteration. General Eisenhower's job had been primarily a political one. Mine was essentially military. His was the task of using his great powers of charm and persuasion to bring together the nations of free Europe into a coalition for mutual defense--to get them to agree on a common plan of action. Mine was to get them to do what they had promised to do. He was the eloquent salesman who persuaded the housewife to subscribe to the pretty magazines. I was the So-and-So with the derby hat and the cigar, who came around to collect at the first of the month."

Of all the conflicts in NATO's history none have been more traumatic or acrimonious than the relations between the Greeks and the Turks. However, in spite of these conflicts, NATO continues to function.

LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES

The history of NATO to date is replete with the many and varied diversities in equipment, training, doctrine, logistics, etc. Hixson and Cooling write "...In 1952 after a stressful two years of trying to develop combat forces, NATO's military committee resolved to de-emphasize the need for more combat reinforcements and give priority to logistic support for the forces on the ground at the time. What transpired included great strides forward in the construction of NATO pipelines, organization of a priorities board for combined and joint transportation needs, slow standardization of supply producers, establishment of a NATO standardization agency and an offshore procurement program, as well as assistance to modernizing the continental armies via the training assistance teams provided both by the United States and Great Britain. There remained, however, an inherent lack of flexibility in logistics support systems via the nationally controlled LOCs.

The problem found clear delineation in CENTAG and NORTHAG, where both the United States and Great Britain maintained expeditionary-type establishments, while the Belgians, Dutch, French, and West Germans maintained zone of interior systems. The latter were stationary, incapable of lineal extension and only moderately capable of supporting homeland defense in any prolonged combat. Only the British and American systems could truly sustain offensive operations on the World War II model, and even the British logistical system, like their continental neighbors, functioned under their Ministry of Defense through the British NATO commander, not SACEUR. Tactical concepts might be adjusted between the various local forces, but logistical doctrine could not. There was simply no real authority for exchange of supplies between nations, and no options for SACEUR to direct or command any of them. What resulted then was a strictly compartmentalized deployment of national armies, commanded by allied commanders with no real control over logistical operations behind the combat zone.

A more recent assessment done in August 1988 by Thomas A. Callaghan Jr. Titled: Pooling Allied and American Resources To Produce a Credible, Collective Conventional Deterrent we find these comments ... "The lack of standardized weapons and equipment imposes severe limitations on the ability of one ally to reinforce another. No NATO force can come to the aid of another unless it can be logistically supported in that other force's area. Suppose they use different refueling systems, with different couplings; or different ammunition for their guns; or different weapons requiring different repair parts and repair tools."

Callaghan continues... "The destandardization of most of NATO's weapons and equipment carries over into its 44 military service supply systems, coupled with disparate weapons systems to be supported, consumes resources that could much better be applied to credible collective defense. Moreover, these many national and service support systems would produce what former NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns correctly described as 'a logistics nightmare' if ever NATO should have to defend itself."

"A logistics nightmare" is probably a most accurate description of the logistical structure in NATO today. This conclusion is based on numerous other documents which support this pressure.

To those who ask "What about our STANAG's etc?" Callaghan replies... "Every country has its own industrial standards, or industrial norms. These standards give us the English word "standardization" and the French "normalization"--meaning produced to a standard, or a norm.

NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) are supposed to anticipate and forestall both hardware and software interoperability problems by (among other things) harmonizing industrial standards.

They do, and they do not. They take far too long to negotiate. Industrial standards are a very effective non-tariff barrier. There is a great reluctance to give up a domestic standard in favor of a NATO STANAG. Moreover, technology developments are invariably ahead of the ponderous STANAG process. Governments are unwilling to agree to STANAGs that negate ongoing developments, so they stall and delay. Even when STANAGs are agreed, governments all too frequently ignore them."

ARMAMENT, TRAINING AND TACTICAL DOCTRINES

As a follow-on to the discussion on the logistics system, the following points on standardization of armament are provided by Hixson and Cooling..."General Paul-Henry Spaak told the Alliance in December 1959: 'We have not yet in NATO any real standardization of armaments. We have not been able, except once or twice, on a very small scale, to share out tasks in connection with new military production.' There was to be strikingly little change over the next decade, and it seemed, as Spaak said, 'We persist in reinventing what has already been invented and we refuse to trust our friends with secrets known to our enemies.' Such gloomy observations hid the fact that operational procedures, numerous measures to increase the interoperability of existing equipment, and more and more standardization of thinking about future equipment requirements did occur, even in the absence of concrete accomplishments.

Many of these differences in hardware could be traced to doctrinal divergence. Research and development people in various ministries expended countless hours in study and planning for divisional organization, e.g., the triangular versus pentagonal--the Americans called it 'pentomic'--concepts, which resulted in increased impediments to allied interoperability in the field and showed what different missions each NATO member thought it had in a possible war. At least some of the armies sat down to tactical symposia and discussed doctrinal differences, seeking resolution. The Germans and the Americans in particular conducted annual tactical meetings such as the one in 1964 which reached accord on such matters as:

- planning for operations in Central Europe would consider a limited type war as most probable.
- FRG concept of 'close interlocking action with the enemy' in event of surprise tactical nuclear attack be studied further.
- air mobility is a proven tactical approach and should be considered in future operational planning.
- advantages are gained by having certain dual capable weaponry/i.e., nuclear and conventional.

- divisional organization should reflect a manageable span of control and an adequate number of command echelons--three/four brigades per division and two/seven battalions per brigade...."

Hixson and Cooling continue "...At the very least, the decade of the sixties witnessed increasing dialogue on standardization. If still a goal and not a reality in the main--especially for major weapons systems--progress could be seen when American generals like Arthur Trudeau could unabashedly proclaim that even Americans did not have any monopoly on ideas. But to rank and file Americans, as well as other soldiers in NATO, standardization in the period probably meant Europe would use American arms and equipment. Various NATO ad hoc, mixed working groups provided antidotes to that conclusion, but there still seemed to be too much proliferation, even in the number of agencies and offices within each national military establishment which worked on the standardization issue. All of this meant few real results for the NATO generals who faced westward against a threat mounted by an enemy very much possessed of standardized weapons, equipment, and doctrine.

At more prosaic levels, 'A German, Belgian, French, Netherlands, and American officer may find themselves on a committee calling for the location of Netherlands troops on German soil, whose training may be conducted in Belgium, who will be under the command of a headquarters located in France supplied by equipment manufactured in the United States,' proclaimed one media article on NATO in the early sixties. As these officers from member nations rotated steadily through international headquarters in a maturing NATO environment, the problems seemed the same, only the decade was different. They might quibble whether or not they functioned in a 'combined' or 'integrated' facility, but they still dealt with the same bewildering issues of peacetime alliance warfare preparation. Empathy, professionalism, nationalism, cohesiveness, and communication were those factors stressed as important in one pocket-guide to success in an international headquarters. Elaborate language and educational programs conducted by NATO officials sought to alleviate such factors. The NATO Defense College--first at Paris, later at Rome--worked to train a new breed of officer, NATO in focus. Even generals from member nations tended to be far less parochial and purely nationalistic than had been the case in the 1950s. Some, like General James H. Polk, USAEUR commander from 1967 to 1972, deliberately sought to provoke thought and discussion during his tenure between his American subordinates and allies concerning the use of tactical nuclear devices, alliance operations and training, and other professional topics which affected them all..."

One of the strong supporters of RSI (Rationalization Standardization and Interoperability) was General George S. Blanchard. His thoughts on RSI taken from his Oral History are as follows: "...I pushed half a dozen programs to help that professionalism. One was

the German language program, and I got over 1,000 letters from Germans when they became aware of this program. ...The commanders as you remember, had to go to a course in language at the Defense Language Institute...we..., really the interoperability as the thing that I put the greatest stress on...So there were so many places at which it is absolutely essential in view of the Russian doctrine which is attack down boundaries if possible. In addition, we started in 1973, General Doctor Schoonefeld, who was the Corps Commander of the II Corps for six years, and I worked on the very first interoperability exercise called SPRINGEX which was up in the 1st Armored area and we did it at Weiden. It was the first Map X if you will, which was totally combined, where units had to attack across Corps boundaries, where we had to coordinate the artillery and support each other, where we had the cavalry and the covering force working with the German units, where an attack came right down the Corps boundary and we had to react to it, engineers got into it, the combat support got into it, the service support got into it...We repaired their M113's when we had the capability. They used our helicopters in the development of the SOP's, Joint SOP's, French, German and English translations of them. The 88-word interoperability concept which was started really with the artillery...Of course, the whole key of it and the reason behind it was the fact that the reinforcing divisions coming over from the states might very well go the Dutch commander, the British commander, the German commander, and what does that commander do when he reports to the Dutch commander and says "Sir, General Jones commanding the 2nd Armored Division; What are your orders?" He's got to understand RSI..."...The whole area of differences in tactics, techniques, procedures and concepts was approached in a different way. You remember that General Bill DePuy started the "Concept papers." The concept papers where the Germans had a series of papers in functional areas in which each nation agreed upon, and where the two nations agreed upon common definitions, common approaches and common perceptions of the threat of the air-ground situation and so on...to allow the movement of a Reserve brigade with a combination of German, US and French helicopters. ...In fact you will remember that in a number of occasions we had units operating with the Belgians, the Dutch and the British in NORTHAG..."

PERSONAL INTERVENTION

General Ridgway in his book Soldier writes " when General Eisenhower went to Paris, the free world, and particularly the United States, was rightfully apprehensive that the war raging in Korea was the prelude to World War III. Among all the free nations of the west there was a keen realization of how woefully unprepared we were to defend ourselves if this Korean conflict did spread into global war. The first task facing General Eisenhower, therefore, was to bring the heads of the NATO governments together, to get them to agree to fill without delay the great military vacuum that had been created by our precipitate demobilization and hasty departure from Europe at the end of World war II.

History records how brilliantly he accomplished that mission. He fired their imaginations. He awoke in them a realization of their danger, of the tragic consequences that would surely occur in the event of Russian armed aggression. He brought agreement where there had been no agreement, or at best a hopeless apathy. He got the promise of action."

There is no question that it was General Eisenhower's personal intervention and influence that brought about the early success of NATO. Various publications cite Eisenhower's popularity and persuasiveness which resulted in the early organization and capability of NATO.

His successor, General Ridgway, was also a personal hands on type of commander and he has said earlier it was his job to collect the IOU's which had been promised to Eisenhower.

General Lemnitzer in his Oral History writes about his personal intervention into problems or activities that undoubtedly were successful. In looking at the other SACEURs it would appear that all of them have exercised a high degree of personal intervention.

At the lower levels certainly a good example of personal intervention is that of General Blanchard's emphasis on interoperability. Considering the political implications and restrictions these commanders and high level officers faced, their service has been commendable.

PERSONALITIES OF SENIOR COMMANDERS

The personalities of senior commanders such as Eisenhower, Ridgway, Montgomery and Gruenther are well known, publicized and will not be belabored here.

Ridgway in *Soldier* goes to some length in describing his relationship with Montgomery. He writes ... "As soon as I took command I asked the Field Marshal to come in and sit down so that we could have a very close and intimate talk. I pointed out to him that I had assumed this command with no option on my part. It was a military assignment which I had not sought, I told him that I was well aware of his great stature as a soldier, and of the world-wide reputation which he so deservedly enjoyed, and that I could well understand that it might be difficult for him to be a deputy to an officer considerably younger in years and experience than he--an officer who once had been his subordinate. Because he knew the great respect and admiration that I had for him, I wanted to be perfectly sure that there was complete understanding between us. His views, I told him, were always welcome. They would always be given attentive consideration. But there was going to be but one commander--and when my decisions were announced, that was it. There wasn't to be any question about them.

He responded as you would expect a great soldier to respond. He pledged his complete loyalty, and that I had, throughout my days with NATO. Monty is a very positive man, however, a free spirit who is accustomed to speak his mind with complete freedom, regardless of the views of anybody else, whether they be held by the officials of his own government, or prime ministers, or military superiors. The result was that certain small difficulties arose at times, when the Deputy Commander, in that amiable offhand way he had, would express views exactly opposite to my own."

Ridgway concludes this assessment by saying that in spite of numerous incidents of Montgomery expressing his "unofficial views" they got along very well.

Although other senior leaders are not identified it is obvious that their personalities and habits become well known to the theater commander. Again quoting Ridgway on his initial briefing with Eisenhower "This brought us to the discussion of the individuals, both military men and statesmen, with whom I would be dealing. In a masterly series of vignettes he described the character and the attitudes of each, told me the ones I could trust implicitly, and those whom he felt I could not trust. It was an appraisal of men and their motives which proved invaluable to me in the months that followed. In only one case, as I came to know these men, did I feel that his evaluation had been in error. One French statesman whom General Eisenhower felt to be unworthy of trust in all his relationships with me proved forthright, honest, and completely dependable."

SUMMARY

General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in an article titled "NATO After Zero INF" in the Armed Forces Journal International, March 1988 issue writes, "Few, if any, of NATO's nearly 40 years have been tranquil. The alliance has endured a variety of challenges since it was created in 1949, challenges that have come from without as well as within. NATO members resisted Soviet efforts to intimidate the west on a number of occasions..."

There has been no shortage of intra-alliance crises either: Suez in 1956, the French withdrawal from the integrated military structure in 1966 and the continuing dispute over Cyprus are but three of these..."

In spite of the difficulties cited by General Galvin, NATO continues as a sixteen nation alliance. This alliance (less France) provides the Combined Forces recognized as NATO but can be expected to continue to encounter the six problem areas addressed in this paper. Fortunately, at least for now, solutions to these problems can be worked in a peacetime environment.

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